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Abbreviations 
• AMC – Asset Management Company 
• BoP – Balance of Payments 
• CAC - Collective Action Clause  
• CDS – Credit Default Swap 
• EBA – European Banking Authority 
• EDP - Excessive Deficit Procedure 
• EFSF – European Financial Stability Facility 
• EFSM – European Financial Stability Mechanism 
• EMU – European Monetary Union 
• ERM – European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
• ESCB – European System of Central Banks 
• ESM – European Stability Mechanism  
• EU – European Union 
• EWG - Eurogroup Working Group 
• FFA – Financial assistance Facility Agreement 
• FROB - Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria or the fund for orderly bank 
restructuring 
• GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
• IMF – International Monetary Fund 
• MIP - macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
• MoU – Memorandum of Understanding  
• MS – Member State 
• MTO – Medium Term Objective 
• OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
• QM – Qualified Majority 
• SAREB - Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración 
• SGP – Stability & Growth Pact 
• TEESM – Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
• TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
• ULC – Unit Labour Cost 
• VAT - Value Added Tax 
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Problem area 
Going back less than ten years, the economic landscape of today would appear 
incomprehensible. Along with the European Monetary Union (EMU), European Union 
(EU) had established a stability and growth pact to ensure economic convergence 
between the participants in the monetary union aimed at avoiding any one country 
running a persistent deficit resulting in mounting debt. The result was a 60% limit on 
public debt as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a 3% limit on the 
government deficit, also measured against GDP. (European Commission – Economic and 
Financial Affairs) By these standards the EMU was performing very well, if anything, it 
was the countries widely considered as the responsible economic actors today that were 
underperforming.  
 
Figure 1 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Euro Area as a whole was actually conforming to the 
requirement of a maximum deficit of 3%, with Germany actually breaching the 
requirement for a number of years. As illustrated Spain, now one of the culprits in the 
on-going sovereign debt-crisis was running a surplus for a lengthy period, meaning it was 
decreasing the government debt for a number of years. When looking at public debt, the 
picture is much the same.  
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Figure 2 
 
As we have now illustrated Spain, who is the beneficiary of the a €100bn bailout from 
EFSF/ESM appeared to be doing quite fine in the years leading up to the crash of 
Lehmann Brothers in 2008 (The Telegraph – Finance). By actually having a public budget 
surplus the government debt was declining at a quite impressive rate, especially when 
compared to the EA17 average. The question then remain, why, less than 5 years after 
touching a debt level of a mere 35% of GDP would Spain be in need of a massive 
bailout from the European Union? 
In this project we, among other things, aim to answer exactly that question. In this 
respect we can draw on the substantial amount of existing literature on the causes of the 
sovereign debt crisis thereby identifying the underlying and perhaps more important 
factors contributing to the continuing negative GDP growth across the peripheral 
countries in the Eurozone (Eurostat – General Government Gross Debt). 
The gravity of the sovereign debt crisis is of course not lost on the lawmakers in 
Brussels. In 2011 the Council adopted a treaty amendment to article 136 in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union enabling the creation of the European Stability 
Mechanism by adding a few extra lines to the article (ESM, 2012):  
"The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any 
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required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality." 
(European Council, 2011)1 
 
In September 2012 the 17 members of the Euro Area signed the treaty establishing ESM 
(ESM, 2012). The sole purpose of ESM is to provide financial assistance to countries in a 
precarious economic situation in the form of loans with capital collected on the market, 
but backed and partially financed by the participating countries. (ESM – About ESM) The 
treaty amendment only allows financial assistance accompanied by strict conditionality, and 
whereas ESM is just a piece of the puzzle designed to improve the economic situation, 
the conditionality attached to the emergency loans is a welcome opportunity to address 
some of the underlying imbalances in the monetary union.  
By identifying the underlying factors causing and prolonging the crisis in the peripheral 
countries we want to focus our analysis on the ESM and the role the institution play in 
solving the debt crisis, specifically the conditionality imposed seen from a political 
economic perspective. In the end we can exemplify using empirical material on the actual 
conditions on Spain and use this as an indication for the theoretical basis and assess if 
the conditionality will help eliminate the actual imbalances in the EMU, or be a 
temporary bandage on an open wound. 
  
                                                
1 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf#page=6 
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Problem Formulation 
How does the ESM attempt to decrease the macro-economic imbalances within 
the Eurozone and is there a viable alternative? 
Our focus will be on the recapitalisation of the financial sector in Spain, as this was the 
first and most complete example of ESM assistance. To understand how we are going to 
answer this problem formulation, a small introduction to our research design is relevant. 
This will furthermore establish our scope and limitation. First we introduce our 
methodology, which explains our interpretation of the fields of research, and the 
approach taken towards it. Secondly we introduce our theory, which is of an economic 
nature. This limits our answers to the problem formulation to be of an economic 
character, which leaves underlying political structures untouched. The theoretical chapter 
ends with a table summarising the chapter in to two schools, with the purpose of making 
the analysis easily accessible for the reader.   Thereafter the economic climate within the 
Eurozone leading up to the creation of ESM is examined; with the purpose of showing 
the different impacts the EMU has on its member states, and the economic necessity of 
the institution. Hereafter we analyse the ESM Treaty with the purpose of identifying its 
competences, financial instruments and institutional autonomy.  We then analyse the 
conditions imposed on the Spanish budget and banking sector in relation to the re-
capitalisation of Spain’s banking sector to determine their economic theoretical nature. 
On the basis of these findings we will propose an alternative use of ESM competences 
from a Keynesian perspective. This will lead to our conclusion.  
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Methodology and Theory 
Methodological approach 
When conducting research it is important to explain the taken approach and perhaps 
even more importantly, why this approach is chosen. This project rests on an approach 
primarily based on the critical realist school of thought. 
In the critical realist approach ontology and epistemology is of course essential. Ontology 
is our perception of the world and what exists in it. Epistemology on the other hand is 
what we know about the world and how to best attain this knowledge. This is often 
referred to as being the theory of knowledge (Nielsen & Buch Hansen, 2008). Ontology 
is, the main domain in a critical realist optic, and it is on this level that the research takes 
place. Critical realism divides ontology into three domains. The domains are quite 
important as they determine how to conduct research. The three domains are; the 
empirical, the actual and the real (Nielsen & Buch Hansen, 2008; Jespersen, 2009a). The 
empirical domain is seen as our experiences and observations. The actual domain is the 
events taking place whether we observe them or not. The real dimension is structures 
and mechanisms not observable, and what happens in the real domain can have an effect 
on the actual domain (Jespersen, 2009a). The three domains must be seen as three 
different layers, and by conducting an analysis using the available data and events we try 
to shed light on the hidden layer as depicted in the theoretical approaches, namely the 
neo-classical and Keynesian theories. We assume the theories are two estimations of 
reality and use empirical data and actual events to assess which approach appear to fit 
reality the best, well knowing that we may unintentionally disregard important 
mechanisms and structures. Seeing as the two theoretical standpoints we utilise are 
essentially conflicting we must acknowledge that, at the very least, part of the real 
dimension may remain hidden. (Jespersen, 2009a) To counter this we try to collect an 
extensive amount of empirical knowledge to base our arguments upon, to render our 
conclusions as probable as possible. Due to the nature of our analysis we will base our 
arguments on statistical data collected from reputable sources.  
With our problem formulation we have limited the scope of our analysis not just to one 
actors influence on the economic landscape within the EMU but the time-period is 
limited as well, seeing as the EMU is a relatively new construction. Within these defined 
limits, we want to conduct a critical empirical study of the impact our chosen actor, 
ESM, will have on the area as a whole and conclude whether or not we see a viable 
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alternative to the existing approach within our theoretical framework. When studying the 
impact of the ESM another very important methodological concept is revealed, namely 
causality. Every object possesses specific properties and a causal potential to use these 
properties to affect the empirical and real layer, however, possessing the potential is in 
itself no guarantee that it will be realised. (Nielsen & Buch Hansen, 2008) 
 
As a direct consequence of the concept of causality we need to assess the properties of 
the ESM and its potential to actually cause meaningful change in order to justify it as an 
object of interest. To this end we examine the Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism with the specific aim of determining the competences conferred upon ESM 
as well as the margin it is given to act. In methodological terms this enables us to 
estimate the causal potential the mechanism enjoy. To better understand the ESM we 
look at empirical data on its actual response to the events necessitating its existence, 
namely the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Master Financial Assistance Facility 
Agreement (FFA) and Spanish Budget Plan for 2013-2014. These documents indicate the 
general approach taken by the ESM to, within the framework of the economic climate 
and the treaties, impact the events and structures causing the debt-crisis to constitute a 
risk to the economic stability of the Eurozone.  
Establishing the ESM as a causal actor and examining its actions serves as a foundation 
enabling us to analyse the causality between the conditions imposed on the beneficiaries 
of ESM-funding and the economic structures causing the regional imbalances within the 
Eurozone and thereby getting us ever closer to answering our problem formulation. To 
reach a valid conclusion we need to connect the three layers and provide a credible causal 
link between them. We need to put our theoretical framework (our estimations of the 
real domain) into the context of the empirical and actual level to ensure our arguments 
are credible (Jespersen, 2009a). We do so by establishing a relevant theoretical framework 
consisting of monetarist as well as euro-realistic indicators and systematically test the 
conditionality imposed by ESM for said indicators, thereby assessing which, if any, 
theoretical school of thought the ESM is following. As the aim of our analysis is to 
construct a credible argument about the viability of the lending practices of the ESM, we 
then critically examine the explanatory power possessed by our chosen theories to 
explain the real layer. 
Here we draw upon the massive amount of statistical material made available by different 
publishers like OECD, EuroStat, Bank of International Settlements etc. and compare 
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this to the actual events that happened, enabling us to evaluate the validity of the 
arguments put forward in the theories with regards to the very confined area we have 
engaged with. In the end we aspire to connecting the structures, data and events in a 
meaningful way to assess whether or not the ESM is living up to its potential in 
addressing the fundamental imbalances causing the continuing negative growth rates etc. 
in peripheral Eurozone countries.  
The ontological and acknowledgement of causality coupled with the open nature of the 
society does impose some conditionality on our conclusions. No matter how credible our 
arguments, there is no denying that we could have easily ignored or given too little value 
to certain causal explanations or overestimated the causal potential of ESM when 
constructing our alternative to the existing policy. (Nielsen & Buch Hansen, 2008) One 
also has to remember that ESM is merely a piece of a larger institutional puzzle, where 
any number of actors could influence the economic development. Furthermore, as the 
three layers interact the observable reality could change rendering our conclusions 
invalid, but in conducting science one can never be too ambitious, we just have to 
acknowledge that the results will very rarely live up to the ambitions. (Jespersen, 2009a)  
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Economic Theory 
Introduction 
This chapter will first give a historical introduction to a dispute between two schools of 
economics; the Neo-classical and the Keynesian. This is done in order to understand the 
origins of the dispute in relation to the euro-monetarist and the euro-realist school, the 
two schools of thought used throughout our analysis. We use Jesper Jespersen’s 
definition of euro-realism found in his 2012 The Euro. He defines euro-realism as a: 
“(…) macro-economic theory, whose primary purpose is to uncover the factual imbalances in 
each euro country and thereby expose those of the EMU” (Jespersen, 2012, p. 31).  
Furthermore, countries differ and it is impossible to use a one-size fits all theoretical 
model; each scenario is analysed empirically and country specific (Jespersen, 2012). These 
theories will be introduced descriptively. This will be summarised using bullet points in 
order to clarify what we seek to examine throughout our analysis. We have chosen an 
economic approach to the subject because of the economic nature of the current crisis 
and will therefore not introduce political theory as a part of our theoretical framework. 
Acknowledging that the current disputes and the possible solutions to the current 
Eurozone crisis depend heavily on political willingness we acknowledge that such choices 
limit the realisation of our economic findings. However, we still consider economic 
theory as the best tool for analysing the macro-economic imbalances leading up to the 
crisis and the possible impact and competences of the ESM. 
Macroeconomic Theory 
Macroeconomics is a term developed in the post-war era between the first and second 
world war. Macroeconomics cannot be seen as a single theory, but more like an umbrella 
term describing how households and companies affect each other, and how public 
intervention influence the behaviour of the market (Jespersen, 2009b; Sims, 1980). Today 
we calculate GDP to show this. The purpose is to create a model in which the economics 
of a nation can be explained. This is macroeconomics (Jespersen, 2009b). 
Macroeconomics revolves around the circulation of money within the society. Therefore 
sectors become important, namely the interactions between them. To explain this further 
a simple model can be set up. In this model we could include five main groups: the 
public sector, firms, goods, households and the labour market. All sectors interact with 
each other and as macroeconomics is about the circulation of money, these interactions 
result in a flow of capital back and forth between the sectors creating a level of 
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interdependence between them (Jespersen, 2009b; Sørensen, 2005). The 
macroeconomics regarding monetary policy have been influenced by two core causal 
explanatory directions, a direction focusing on supply side, that is represented by the 
neo-classical theory, and its counterpart based on the demand side represented by 
Keynesianism (Jespersen, 2009c).  
In Neo-classical theory an economic system is characterised by perfect competition and 
at the same time economic rationality meaning that both companies and households try 
to optimise their profits, be it money or utility (Rosen, 1997; Jespersen, 2009b). The 
market will secure full employment in the medium term and the biggest challenge in this 
optic is when the market becomes subjects to interventions from the state.  
“The great depression, like most other periods of severe unemployment, was produced by 
government mismanagement rather than by any inherent instability of the private economy” 
(Friedman, 1962: p. 38) 
It should be evident that neo-classical theory is based on a liberal way of thinking, where 
the market is best served with as few obstacles in the form of policies as possible in 
order to secure equilibrium (Rosen, 1997; Jespersen, 2009b).  
This takes us to the Keynesian school. It was developed in a period characterised by high 
degrees of unemployment because of the increased specialisation within the industrial 
sector, which the neo-classical theories at that time were unable to explain (Jespersen, 
2009b). The ground work was done by John Maynard Keynes, and his critique of the 
neo-classical model was that market forces was not self regulating, and that more supply 
would not necessarily create increased demand (Jespersen, 2009b). Furthermore the 
households contribute with a certain degree of uncertainty by acting without full 
information within the settings, perhaps not knowing much of the macroeconomic 
implications surrounding it, for instance policies. Therefore the households can be said 
to act without knowing the full effects of its actions, which would lead to imbalances 
(Jespersen, 2009c; Tobin, 1993). Keynes main argument was that the government in 
order to secure equilibrium should: “(...) look after the unemployment and the budget will look 
after itself.” (Keynes, 1982). Both Friedman’s and Keynes’ macro theories assume a closed 
economy were trade between countries is not considered to be of a major importance 
(Jespersen, 2009b). Therefore their theories cannot help us to explain today’s situation. 
In order to do so we will introduce a Euro-monetarist along with a Euro-realist 
perspective to capture the imbalances within the Eurozone. 
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Euro-monetarists and Euro-realists 
 The aim of introducing the two theoretically tranches, is to detect Euro 
Monetarist or Euro Realist fingerprints in the Spanish Budget Plan for 2013-2014. 
Through the previous it should be evident that the impact of the financial crisis in 2007-
2008 has been different in core and peripheral countries. This indicates that there is an 
uneven sharing of risk within the Euro area, which needs a bit of explanation. In a 
hypothetical situation where a country like Spain were subject to a risk in one part of the 
country, for instance a bad olive harvest, Spain would be able through taxes to even the 
risk over the country through a redistributive financial policy. The Eurozone lacks this 
redistributive fiscal system, because the EMU is a monetary system and not a political 
system. The redistributive fiscal system does not even exist within the Union (Artis, 
2007). It is furthermore difficult for a member state of the Euro to use its own fiscal 
system in order to adjust their budgets, because when a country experience a recession it 
will have a higher public deficit and, given the SGP criteria, members of the EMU may 
conduct an expansive fiscal policy only within these boundaries. This is an example of 
how the member states automatic stabilisers are restricted in their possible effects (De 
Grauwe, 2012; McKay & Reis, 2012). Therefore it becomes relevant to know the Euro 
Monetarist and Euro Realist theoretical approach in order to understand if it is this 
approach that the ESM is conducting in the Spanish Budget Plan. 
A Monetary Union 
 The idea of a monetary union stems from Robert Mundells idea of an optimal 
currency area. His idea was that trade between economically similar countries would have 
economic integration as a spill over effect which would lead to new experiments 
(Mundell, 1961). One of these spill over effects he described as being a single currency, 
and with a single currency a single central bank which job would be to ensure the 
Balance of Payments (BoP) and full employment (Mundell, 1961). In order to get a 
deeper understanding of the connection between the BoP and full employment in 
relation to a monetary union, a further definition is required. The BoP, like GDP, is a 
statistical concept providing numbers for economic transactions with the rest of the 
world for a country for a given time period in market prices. The BoP generally operates 
with two core classifications, the current account and the capital account. The current 
account is a country’s net income, and consists of import and export of goods and 
services along with income. It covers both the public and the private sphere. The current 
account is affected by unit labour costs, exchange rates and growth rates (IMF, 1995). 
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Unit labour costs can be said to have an ambivalent effect on the BoP as it can both have 
an impact on BoP and be affected by it. One argument is that by reducing the unit labour 
cost a country can regain its competiveness, which is good for the export and thereby 
balance the BoP. This is a neo-classical argument (Felipe & Kumar, 2011). The 
Keynesians do not fully acknowledge this argument, as countries that experienced huge 
growth within exports in the post-war era also experienced a significant increase in the 
wage-level. The wage-level on its own is not crucial as exports also depend on the type of 
goods a country produces is essential as well as the productivity-level (Felipe & Kumar, 
2011). Germany has experienced growth on their exports, while restraining the wage-
level unlike other member states of the euro. This is due to German national law, which 
makes the German government obliged to focus on growth to the BNP, employment, 
price stability and balance between import and export (Engberg et al, 2005). The reason 
why the growth in German exports has not resulted in a higher unit labour cost, is 
therefore of a political nature.  
The capital account consists of the financing of real resources, meaning that it operates 
with non-produced items that are needed for production. It will therefore outline the net 
changes in national ownership of assets. It is here we find government bonds, foreign 
bank loans etc. (IMF, 1995). A deficit in the capital account would indicate that money is 
being transferred out of the country, but could at the same time suggest that the country 
is increasing its asset in the foreign market. This is the case in government bond trading.    
The relationship between full employment and BoP is influenced by the approach taken 
toward a currency area. Normally in a currency area were member states have their own 
currency, the pace of employment is influenced by the readiness of surplus countries to 
inflate. In the case of a single currency area the inflation level is dictated by the 
willingness of central authorities to allow unemployment in deficit areas (Mundell, 1961; 
Maurel & Schnabl, 2011).   
By having the same currency, some common rules apply in order for such a union to 
have marginally equal impact on the members (Bladen-Hovell: 2007). This means that 
monetary policies are decided at a European level, so that the ECB sets the key interest-
rate levels (Verdun, 2010). This essentially means that countries joining the Eurozone 
relinquish key monetary policy-instruments, such as the opportunity to devaluate its 
currency in order to gain a higher degree of competiveness. It is stated in article 127 (2) 
in TFEU that it is the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) task: "to define and 
implement the monetary policy of the union", and article 128 in TFEU, that the only bank 
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allowed to print Euros is the European Central Bank (ECB), which disable a member 
state to define their own monetary policy. The monetary policy followed within the 
Eurozone builds upon four principles set up in the Maastricht treaty article 109j (1), 
which is 1) a High degree of price stability. The applicant should have an inflation rate 
close to one of the three best performers. 2) Sustainability of the government financial 
position, by this meaning that member states do not create a huge deficit 3) normal 
fluctuations on the exchange rate due to ERM, and 4) durability on the long interest rate 
levels. But even though there has been criteria's defined for the member states to create 
an optimal currency area by dictating convergence, it seems as if it has created resulted in 
macro-economic imbalances. The Euro-members’ current problems are imbalances 
between core countries and the peripheral countries, which are evident with the cases of 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. But what has then created the 
imbalance? Mundell’s argument was that:  
 "The fault lies not with the type of currency area, but with the domain of the currency 
 area. The optimum currency area is not the world (Mundell, 1961: p. 659)". 
This indicates that the currency area theoretically might not be a bad idea, but it needs 
similarities as stated earlier. Furthermore a currency area makes it harder, as earlier stated, 
for a member state to rely on what is called the automatic stabiliser, and the mistrust 
from the market could potentially send the member state into an even worse recession 
(De Grauwe, 2012). We acknowledge that the ECB took on the role of lender of last resort 
on 6th of September thereby neutralising the market differentiation in bond rates of EMU 
and standalone countries by their default risk. However, De Grauwe’s argument is still 
important in explaining the developments prior to this date.  
Between the Euro countries cost of borrowing with a common exchange rate made loans 
more secure, transparent and therefore cheaper (Uxo, Paul & Febrero, 2011). With the 
Euro the member states pursued different growth strategies. One was an export led 
growth strategy aiming to boost export internally in the EU further. The other was an 
expansive strategy designed to create domestic demand through borrowing externally in 
the Eurozone. An example of this is Germany that has led an export-based policy, and 
Spain that has led an expansive strategy (ibid.).  
The Euro-monetarist Perspective 
 The economic policy existing within the Eurozone is based on article 120-126 in 
the TFEU. If a country generates a deficit the procedures that needs to be taken is given 
by article 126 in the TFEU and are further specified in the stability and growth pact 
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(SGP) and also through the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). So SGP, 
EDP and TFEU defines what to do if a member state experience an excessive deficit. 
The interpretation of these policies can be divided into a two-fold theoretically dispute 
between the Keynesian and Neo-classical school (Morris et al., 2007). The Neo-classical 
and with that the euro monetarist approach defines four broad terms that specifies what 
consequences a fiscal policy has. First, if a state runs a persistent budget deficit and in 
doing so increase public debt, the real interest rate will increase, which leads to fewer 
private investments and essentially leading to lower capital stock (Morris et al, 2007). 
Secondly it is believed that fiscal constraints are meant to alleviate mistrust from the 
financial markets, especially if the trends from the first scenario are experienced, thereby 
lowering the interest rate in government bonds. Thirdly, if there was to become a 
supranational mechanism for fiscal policy, it needs to reflect a spill over effect of the 
experiences encountered. This basically means that if a country runs a deficit, it is to 
implement a practice, which within the Union is deemed as functional. A fourth point is, 
that if a member state have a tendency to accumulate a deficit, it would be difficult to 
secure price stability within the Eurozone (Morris et al., 2007).  
Monetary Instruments 
The preventive arm of the EDP is to secure the general government balance deficit in 
compliance with SGP criteria of max -3% Budget deficit and max 60% of GDP gross 
government debt (Morris et al., 2007; Schuknecht et al., 2011). The preventive arm works 
through a medium term objective (MTO), which states how a member state will ensure 
rapid growth progress towards sustainability considering public investments as means to 
secure stability. The corrective arm on the other hands has a more strict nature,(Morris et 
al., 2007; Schuknecht et al., 2011). Before using the corrective arm, the Commission must 
take into account which effects the MTO has, and thereafter initiate a program that 
considers what actual measures needs to be taken. This could be pension reforms, or 
other public cutbacks in order to reduce public debt (Morris et al., 2007; Schuknecht et 
al., 2011). 
Acknowledging that the EMU had created macro-economic imbalances between the 
member states a Macro-Economic Procedure (MIP) was added to the monetary 
instruments of the Commission in December 2011 (Commission, 2012). The MIP allows 
the commission to adopt preventive recommendations to MS at an earlier stage stop 
increasing macro-economic imbalances. In cases of severe imbalances an the corrective 
arm of the MIP, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) can be opened for a member 
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state. Under such circumstances the member state “Will have to submit a corrective action plan 
with a clear roadmap and deadlines for implementing corrective action” (Ibid, p.1) The MIP – 
together with the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact, with its focus on sustainable 
public finances – is at the heart of the EU’s strengthened economic governance 
 
The Euro-monetarist theory focuses on stability and growth through price stability and 
market efficiency.” This allows private consumers and investors to make well-informed consumption 
and investment decisions and to allocate resources more efficiently (ECB – Monetary Policy).  
The route to obtaining such price stability and solve the current macro-economic 
imbalances of the Eurozone is through increasing fiscal policy compliance to the SGP 
secured at the supra-national level. “The MIP – together with the reinforced Stability and Growth 
Pact, with its focus on sustainable public finances – is at the heart of the EU’s strengthened economic 
governance” (European Commission – Economic Governance) 
The Euro-Realist Perspective 
As earlier established an alternative to the Euro-monetarist approach is explained using 
critique devised by Jesper Jespersen. This approach departs from the idea that the market 
powers within the EU are not self-regulating. The Euro-realist ground assumption is like 
the Keynesian way based on households not acting rationally. The household creates 
imbalances by saving, or investing their money, and this creates market distortions. 
Furthermore the private and public economy cannot be seen as two separate economic, 
as the private sectors actions will have an effect on public sphere, and public regulations 
likewise have an effect on the market (Jespersen, 2012; Tobin, 1993). In a Euro-realist 
optic the current setup with a “one size fits all” is not applicable. This is to be explained 
further. When the public for instance is in debt, the private sector in a closed economy 
would have experienced a surplus. Today’s economies are not closed, therefore the zero-
sum game assumption arising from the closed economies need to be but in a broader 
context (Jespersen, 2012).  
To establish the differences between the euro-monetarist and euro-realist, we present a 
short introduction of the core concepts. The focal point of the dispute is the 
understanding of the ‘one size fits all’ monetary policy that followed with the creation of 
the Euro. Euro-realism differs in the way that it operates with the actual imbalances, in 
this instance through the Euro crisis (Jespersen, 2012). A major critique is that by making 
the banking sector independent, it has become a too powerful institution, and that the 
Eurozone is too depend on the international financial sector (Jespersen, 2012). The fact 
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that the Eurozone has become dependent on the international financial sector has been 
problematic as to a euro-realist financial markets do not always act rationally.  
When there is high growth/demand in an economy a government should impose 
growth-restricting measures such as tax increases to avoid economic overheating and 
bubble creation. In periods of low growth or recession a government should disburses 
investments and tax deductions to spur investment and decrease unemployment. 
According to Euro-realists, a free market would bring about too violent economic 
rollercoaster resulting in societal instability and it is therefore the purpose of fiscal policy 
to even out the ride by controlling demand (Jesper Jespersen, 2012). 
In euro-realism four major points can be examined. First there is the ECB, where the 
major critique is that it follows a net inflation rate. This is assumed to be wrong as the 
financial crisis has different impacts within the Eurozone. Secondly private banks needs 
to have capital equity, and risk based business needs to be transferred to other 
independent firms, in order to secure that banks runs safe business only. Thirdly the 
Eurozone is in need of redistributive solidarity expenditures, thereby sharing the risk 
between the countries. Fourth the SGP should force Eurozone participants to even out 
BoP surpluses and deficits and create a programme to secure employment (Jespersen, 
2012).  
Sub-Conclusion 
With departure in the theoretical chapter we want to make a table illustrating what we are 
going to examine in our analysis, and in which perspective. The parameters we are 
looking after are; first the imbalances on the BoP meaning that the countries 
experiencing the biggest imbalances also are in need of the most adaptation of new 
domestic policies. Secondly correcting fiscal policies. Thirdly the unit labour cost. This is 
because of the argument regarding what generates full employment, the supply or the 
demand side (Jespersen, 2012). In table1 the economic theoretical solutions to the 
macro-economic imbalances we focus on in our analysis are presented. Following the 
ESM treaty analysis we will present table 2 where we combine the theoretical solutions 
with the competences of the ESM. Finally, at the end of our analysis we introduce table 3 
which will contain the actual economic conditions imposed in the Spanish Budget plan 
and our Euro-realist alternative. 
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Table 1 
 Euro-monetarism Euro-realist 
1. Macro-economic 
imbalances 
Rigorous enforcement of 
the SGP criteria and 
more economic 
governance in the 
Eurozone through 
corrective instruments 
such as the MIP. 
Create a redistributive 
fiscal policy mechanism to 
even out macro-economic 
imbalances shown for 
instance in the BoP. 
2. National accounts 
(public deficit & debt) 
Decrease public deficit to 
decrease national bond 
rates thereby creating 
private investment. 
Focus on decreasing 
unemployment through an 
expansive fiscal policy to 
create domestic demand 
and activate the automatic 
stabilisers. 
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The economic climate in the Eurozone 
Introduction 
The purpose of the following chapter is to present the interconnectedness of the 
financial sector in the Eurozone and analyse the implication hereof. Additionally, we 
analyse the macro-economic imbalances developed inside the EMU and the cause of this 
development. In this regard we begin by looking at Greece as they were the first country 
to exhibit the symptoms of these imbalances. The Greek sovereign debt crisis 
highlighted the inherent weaknesses in the EMU and became the starting point of the 
unfolding debt crisis spread across most of the periphery today. In essence, the chapter 
serves to help us understand the complexity of the current Eurozone debt crisis and the 
backdrop for the establishing of the European Stability Mechanism.  
With the adoption of the Single Currency and thereby the submission of national 
monetary policy liberties, a major source of uncertainty and cross-border lending risk was 
eliminated. Where before currencies could fluctuate, and often did, in pursuit of national 
interests the apolitical nature of the ECB and its inflation fighting treaty bound purpose 
put a stop to such practice. Further, the ECB holds the exclusive right to allow the 
issuing bank notes but is explicitly prohibited from offering overdrafts or any other form 
of credit including the purchase of public debt. All these efforts to heighten the 
separation of politics and money gave the birth to the idea that inter-Eurozone lending 
between banks and government in a healthy economy was basically riskless (Lapavitsas et 
al, 2012). On top of the elimination of national monetary policies the increasing 
liberalization of financial market created with the single market further motivated cross-
border banking.  
“European financial markets have been unified as financial liberalization has spread and 
become deeper. Restriction on financial operations have been abolished among the member 
states.” (Lapavitsas et al. 2012, p.43) 
For the purpose of explaining the cross-border dimension and showing the 
interconnectedness of financial institution in the Eurozone it is useful to split it into a 
core (Germany, France and the Netherlands) and a periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain).  
The Economic Crisis in the Periphery 
The increasing cross-border lending from core to periphery countries is clear as seen in 
Figure 3.   
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Figure 3 
 
In the period 2005-2008 the total core exposure to the periphery more than doubled 
from $1.073,09bn to $2.400,54bn. With the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 
the money market became volatile and core banks were looking for a safer place to invest 
its surplus euro’s away from the US. Moreover the euro protective ECB policies of 
lowering the ECB interest rate made peripheral banks and countries look like relatively 
safe investment:  
“Core banks had no concerns about the creditworthiness of peripheral countries until 2009 
indeed lending to governments seemed a reasonable course of action.” (lapavitsas 2012: p. 
48) 
 
 This tendency is displayed both in the 400 billion dollar increase in core to periphery 
exposure and in the credit default swap (CDS) index. CDS can be seen an insurance 
product investors can purchase to insure that if their investment goes south loses will be 
covered. CDS spreads are therefore a good indicator of how the financial markets’ 
perceive the investment risk in different countries. (oxforddictionaries.com - Credit 
Default Swap.) The lower the basis points of CDS spreads the safer the sovereign bonds 
are perceived by the market. As we can see in the CDS sovereign spread 5 years (Figure 
4), after Lehman Brothers collapsed turmoil in the financial market arose in Europe as 
well but then settled down between the third and fourth quarter of 2009. Here sovereign 
bonds are considered secure investments in a turbulent financial market (Lapavitsas, 
2012).   
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Figure 4 
 
 
 To understand the interdependence of Eurozone banks we will show a possible 
scenario based on the economic developments that followed in 2010. We will do this by 
comparing the total core financial exposure to periphery with the total equity of core 
banks. The total equity is the total of all Ordinary capital, Reserves, Preferences and 
Minorities. It can also be expressed as net assets i.e. the total assets less the total 
liabilities. In other words the total equity is the buffer that a bank holds available to cover 
loses. (Investopedia – Equity) 
In 2008 the total equity of core banks was $0,75tn (BIS.org - consolidated Banking Statistics; 
ECB.europa.eu - Eurosystem Statistical Data Warehouse) and the total exposure of core 
banks to periphery institutions was $2,4tn. Simple math tells us that the exposure to 
periphery is 3,2 times the equity-level. This is only the core exposure to five countries 
and not the total exposure. To put the numbers in to perspective the $2,4tn exposure in 
2008 equalled more than 40% of the GDP of Germany, France, Belgium and 
Netherlands combined. 
Source: Winckelmann & Sørensen, 2011 
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Figure 5 
 
Following this line of thought Lapavitsas gives an example of a possible scenario in the 
case of a single currency collapse.  
 “If an exit from the euro resulted in an 25 % devaluation of domestic currencies, the 
 outcomes would be disastrous for the banking system of the core nations, given current 
 levels of equity” (Lapavitsas et. al., 2012: p. 51).  
As stated in the quote a Greek exit from the Euro would have a huge impact on the 
financial sector of the core countries and the entire European Union. The economic 
shockwaves of a failing Euro would carry consequences, hard to comprehend, for the 
entire EU and beyond, simply due to the sheer size of the exposure (Lapavitsas et al., 
2012) 
 
Now that we have established the financial interconnectedness of the core and periphery 
nations we will now try to unravel the differentiated interests by choosing a critical 
juncture. We set the critical juncture for the creation of the ESM in the first and second 
quarter of 2010. In this period the Eurozone was subject to an on-going financial crisis 
that has been transformed into a debt crisis in many of its member states. This had hit 
Greece particularity hard and the debt-level was looking grimmer than ever as displayed 
in Figure 6. The reason was that Greece had been putting off the economic problems 
that it faced, in the hope of a crisis turnaround.  
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As explained earlier, public debt and public deficit is dictated by the Maastricht treaty and 
SGP, which state that; in order to secure financial stability, a member state can have a 
maximum of 60% public debt of the GDP, and must have a growth rate of 3%. In the 
figure below, it is showed that the public debt of Greece hit a record in 2010 of 147% of 
their GDP and with a GDP growth of -4,9% (Eurostat – Real GDP Growth Rate). The de 
facto recession, now running on its third year, gave little encouragement for a change in 
development.   
Figure 6 
 
 
Greece had been able to continue at this level because both France and Germany broke 
the pact too by not respecting the 3% public deficit limit (Begg & Schelkle, 2004), 
furthermore the average level of public debt in the Eurozone has never been below 60 % 
of GDP even in the profitable years prior to the crisis, which is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Embedded in the SGP the Commission holds sanctioning possibilities towards non-
abiding member states in the form of economic fining (Exenberger, 2004). However the 
execution of such punishments have felt little political encouragement as so far only 
Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg and Sweden have managed not to break the SGP. 
However in 2010 the periphery countries ran public budget deficit severely larger than 
3% as shown in the Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
At this point Ireland was hitting a 30.8 % public deficit to save its financial sector and 
more than doubling the public debt from 28% of GDP in 2008 to 60% in 2010, 
illustrated below.  
This in line with our theory can have two consequences. In Euro-monetarist approach 
the public deficit and the rising unemployment would have the effect of increasing the 
real interest rate, causing fewer private investment, and lower capital stocks, therefore in 
this perspective the public deficit must be decreased (Morris et al., 2007). The Euro-
realist approach in this case are of a fairly similar opinion that the public deficit will have 
an negative effect on the unemployment, but as established this approach is focused on 
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reducing the unemployment in order to reduce the public debt (Jespersen, 2012). From 
these three tables it can be deducted that Public debt and a public deficit seems to have 
an effect on the unemployment, or the other way around creating a vicious circle adding 
further pressure on the public budget resulting in even higher public debt. This is why 
the Spanish situation is of relevance, which is going to be examined later. In the situation 
of Spain the public debt and deficit increases due to less taxes, which is a result of the 
rising unemployment. Consequently both government expenditure to social benefits 
increase and the lowered value of real estate further decreases government income. This 
is what has happened in Spain, as we will elaborate later. 
Downgrading of Euro countries  
The euro countries tried to rescue their financial sectors through massive bailout 
packages to restore liquidity and avoid the total collapse of systemic banks and secure 
deposits of their citizens. This strategy was deployed across the European Union in 
similar fashion, but some nations were better equipped to do so than others. (Jespersen, 
2012) Private debt was then transferred to public debt through the bailouts but this had 
different consequences on the Member states depending on the pre-existing public debt 
and the size of their national financial sector. As illustrated in Figure 6, Greece had a very 
high public debt even before financial crisis making it unable to rescue its banking sector. 
As a consequence, on the ”8th of December 2009 Fitch ratings agency downgrades Greece's credit 
rating from A- to BBB+. Borrowing costs begin an upwards spiral made worse after rival ratings 
agencies S&P and Moody's begin moves that soon categorize Greek debt as junk” (Guardian.co.uk – 
Greece credit rating lowest in Eurozone). 
As the quote suggests this downgrade had the effect that the investors were not willing 
to invest in Greece. At this point banks who had up until now seen all government 
bonds in the Eurozone as being equally secure because of the single currency realise that 
Greece is not Germany. As a result the price on Greek Bonds interest rate soared as 
displayed in Figure 9. Consequently the Greek government loses liquidity to pay the 
interest on its foreign debt and has to offer interest rates on their bonds in the range of 
10–12 % (Bankofgreece.gr - Bond prices). 
 
 28 
Figure 9 
 
The per i l s  o f  c l imbing interes t  rates  
The following is an illustration of the economic consequences of a high interest rate. In 
2008 Greece could expect to pay around 4 per cent on a 10-year loan. In the first quarter 
of 2010 the interest rate is set at 7% for the same loan. To show the significance of the 
3% we make a basic calculation.   
Imagine that the Greek government needs to borrow €1bn. In 2008, Greece could 
expect to pay an interest rate of about 4% for 10 years to borrow this money. Thus, 
Greece will actually pay a total of about €1.48bn. 2 In 2010 the Greek interest rate was as 
mentioned 7% causing an equal loan of €1bn over ten years to cost €1.97bn3, or 
€480.000.000 more than 2008. With a public debt of €340.268.000.000 equalling more 
than 140% of the Greek GDP, a couple of percentage points will tilt the Greek card 
house, as they continuously have to refinance parts of it. Greece could not borrow at this 
rate for very long making it evident that decisions have to be made on whether to save 
the Greek economy or not. (Indiana University, 2011)  
                                                
2 Total amount = principle x (1 + interest rate)number of years 
€1.48 billion = €1 billion x (1+0.04)10 
3 €1.97 billion = €1 billion x (1+0.07)10 
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The establishment of the ESM 
As shown Greece were in desperate need of a financial rescue if it was to stay afloat and 
help arrived on May the 2nd 2010 in the form of a €110bn bailout from the Eurozone 
countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF.com - survey Magazine).  
However, it quickly became apparent that more bailouts were needed if the Eurozone 
was to regain some sort of financial stability and build confidence in the financial market. 
Just 5 years earlier, in 2006, the current British Minister of Finance, George Osborne, 
referred to the Irish economy as “(..) a shining example of the art of the possible in long-term 
economic policymaking.” (Barker, 2010) Now though, both Portugal and Ireland were 
beginning to show similar signs of economic meltdown as Greece. In the beginning of 
2011 their public debt broke 100% of GDP at an extraordinary pace and a public budget 
deficit of 30 % in Ireland and 9.8% in Portugal (Eurostat – General Government 
Deficit/Surplus).  
Figure 10 
 
Ireland received their first bailout in February 2011 and Portugal followed in June 2011 
(EFSF – Lending Operations) by a newly created temporary bailout institution by the name 
of The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF was a temporary 
institution with liquidity of 779 billion euro’s guaranteed by all 17 Eurozone members. 
(ESM – ESM Factsheet) Despite the creation of the EFSF stability was far from secured. 
Spain was looking increasingly unstable with an unemployment rate of 21,6% in 2011 
and rising. Furthermore, as seen in Error! Reference source not found. the public debt 
as almost doubled over a 4-year period going from 36% in 2007 to 69% in 2011 due to 
massive bank bailouts. On top of this the real GDP growth had stagnated (-0,4%) and 
the public budget deficit was at 9,5%. Now, not only were, Ireland and Portugal showing 
an inherent weakness despite performing well in the beginning, now Spain, the 4th largest 
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Economy in the Eurozone (OECD – Quarterly National Accounts) As we have shown in 
the preceding section the core countries amassed an astonishing level of exposure to the 
periphery in the years leading up to the crisis, fuelling the problems faced today. Seeing 
as the peripheral countries did not necessarily fail to converge to the requirements in the 
SGP in the run-up to the crisis, we understand the high degree of public debt 
experienced today as a symptom of other factors rather than the cause of the financial 
turmoil. 
As we have shown in Figure 3 the financial institutions in the core have a rather large 
amount of exposure in the peripheral countries. When the Eurozone was established the 
risk premiums attached to peripheral countries vanished, leaving peripheral debt to be 
perceived almost as safe as core debt, essentially cutting the cost of borrowing money. In 
Spain the cheap credit was used to finance a large housing boom the domestic banks 
could not have financed. (Krugman, 2013) Angelini and Farina 2012 came to much the 
same conclusion, namely that the financial integration of the Eurozone meant that core 
banks, having met domestic demand, took recourse to non-core countries in order to 
meet the demand, which in turn “(..) endangered the banks’ balance-sheet structure.” (Angelini & 
Farina, 2012: p. 655) The housing-boom in Spain resulted in an average of 675.000 
houses being built yearly from 1997-2006, a higher number than France, Germany and 
U.K. combined (Smyth & Urban, 2013). The bubble led to a substantial increase in 
wages in Spain, especially when compared to the biggest lender, Germany.  
Figure 11 
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Furthermore, the increased wage-level caused by the bubble and in turn the abundance 
of credit created excessive domestic demand. (Angelini & Farina, 2012) The deteriorating 
competitiveness, as illustrated in Figure 11, means that manufacturing in the periphery, 
exemplified by Spain, became uncompetitive meaning that the demand caused by the 
huge inflow of money was essentially met by the same countries lending the money, 
namely the core countries (Krugman, 2013) 
Figure 12 
 
As we show in Figure 13, the increased domestic demand coupled with the deteriorating 
competitive position of the peripheral countries clearly shows on the current account, 
with the peripheral countries running a persistently worsening deficit with the core 
countries amassing a solid surplus. Especially Germany and the Netherlands have 
performed well with an average surplus of 4,1% and 5,9% (Eurostat – Balance of the 
Current Account). The Eurozone average almost throughout the period been balanced, 
hinting that most of the deficit in the peripheral countries has been evened out by the 
surpluses in the core countries. The implication is that, while the Spanish government 
have been running a surplus on its budget, the private sector, fuelled by foreign 
investment, have been borrowing large sums of money bringing the real Spanish debt 
level in the end of 2009 to 502% of GDP, with external debt accounting for roughly 1/3 
or 165% of GDP. Of the total debt, the government was responsible for 13%, private 
households 17% and financial and non-financial corporations 70%. (Lapavitsas et.al, 
2012)  
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It was clear that more had to be done than mere ad hoc damage control, as Europe had 
not yet come out of the recession. Confidence in the European market was a vital part of 
the growth plan, and even though the ECB kept lowering the interest rates for 
commercial banks in an attempt to spur investment, stability was the first identified 
condition for growth. However, the continuous reappearance of periphery countries in 
need of financial assistance continued to prevent stability and instead held back 
investment and even gave grounds for financial speculation.   
Angela Merkel expressed the German position as such, “In order to win back trust, we need to 
do more, [..]Where we today have agreements, we need in the future to have legally binding regulations" 
(independent.co.uk - The Merkel plan). Furthermore, according to Indepentdent.co.uk 
Angela Merkel said that the crisis in confidence in the euro could not be solved by 
"short-term fixes". 
The solution was a treaty amendment of article 136 TFEU to allow the creation of a 
permanent stability mechanism in for the Eurozone. Core countries wanted to be able to 
have economic and political influence on the periphery members and saw the possibility 
of re-vitalising the Security and Growth Pact and further conditionality attached to 
financial assistance loans. This became the birth of the ESM. Angela Merkel 
characterised it as“(..) another step in the direction of economic government” (spiegel.de - Saving the 
Euro) 
Sub-conclusion 
The EMU has created macro-economic imbalances in the between core and periphery in 
the form of high surpluses on the balance of payments in the core and equally high 
deficits in periphery. These inherent weaknesses of the monetary union have made the 
impact of the financial crisis much harder on periphery members due to their 
deteriorated competitive position. Countries with a high unit labour cost cannot export 
their way out of the crisis. The fact that the financial markets have perceived Eurozone 
members as equal in risk, and thereby equal in low interest rate, has allowed a country 
like as Spain to ignore the rising BoP deficit and finance growth through private 
borrowing. 
 
Recognising that Greece was not Germany, one by one periphery members have been 
downgraded resulting in heavily climbing interest rates. And one by one Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and last Spain have threatened the financial stability of the Eurozone. However, 
the financial interconnectedness of the Eurozone made the option of state bankruptcy 
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unthinkable for both core and periphery. As shown in exposure figure earlier the 
economic consequences of such an event are incomprehensible because default in one 
country would spread like rings in the water de-stabilising the core and beyond. This is 
the basis for creating the European Stability Mechanism. 
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Competence Analysis of the ESM Treaty 
Introduction 
In the following chapter we dissect the ESM Treaty to establish the institutional structure 
of the ESM functions, what competences it holds, power distribution between members, 
who can apply for founding and what are the conditions of such lending. We want to use 
this to establish the ESM as an institutional actor and show the autonomy possessed by 
ESM to act as a principal. The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
lays down the judicial framework, making it the empirical focal point of the chapter.  
In order to provide an overview of the treaty, we have purposely selected the key-aspects 
of the treaty, and are going to analyse them in the following order: 
! Establishing the ESM 
! The Board of Governors 
! Voting procedure and the allocation of power 
! Capital Stock and The Contribution Key   
! Application and lending procedure 
! Financial Assistance Instruments  
! The Memorandum of Understanding and the Financial Assistance Facility 
Agreement. 
! The Analytical Focal Point – Combining the competences with the economic 
theory 
Analysis of the Competences 
Establishing the ESM 
Before we venture deeper into loans and lending conditions we take a look at the ESM’s 
internal structure. The ESM has three levels. At the top we find the Board of Governors, 
then the Board of Directors and last the Managing Director and his daily staff.  
To start at the beginning, let us look at the facilitating amendment of article 136. 
In order to be able to establish the European Stability Mechanism changes had to be 
made to article 136 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union about the 
proper functioning of the monetary union. To this article the following paragraph was 
added: ”The Member States whose currency is the Euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any 
financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality” (TEESM, 2012, 
p.3). Essential to the wording is the “… be activated only if indispensable” underlining 
that the ESM is a last resort option only to be activated if the stability of the entire 
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Eurozone is in jeopardy, and even then a country is subject to strict conditionality 
(Christova, 2011). 
As a consequence, the Eurozone now has an institution that holds the power to give 
financial assistance directly to troubled governments.  
In Table 2 we see the main structural differences between the EFSF and the ESM. The 
most important difference is that the ESM is a permanent institution, and takes the form 
of an intergovernmental institution enjoying preferred creditor status.  
Table 2 
ESM and EFSF Compared 
 ESM EFSF 
Legal Structure Intergovernmental institution 
under international law 
Private company under 
Luxembourg Law 
Duration Permanent Temporary (June 2010-
June 2013) Applies to new 
support programmes 
Capital Structure Authorised capital stock of 
€700bn divided into:  
€80bn in paid-in capital 
€620bn in committed callable 
capital 
Backed by guarantees of 
the Eurozone Member 
States for up to €780bn 
Capital Contribution vs. 
Guarantee Scheme 
Obligation to contribute to 
paid-in capital stock not 
affected if MS requests or 
receives financial assistance 
MS may step out of 
guarantee scheme when 
they request financial 
assistance 
Max Lending Capacity €500bn €440bn 
Claims to Loans Preferred creditor status only 
junior to IMF 
Pari Passu (On equal 
footing with other 
creditors) 
Source: ESM.europa.eu - ESM Factsheet 
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The Board of Governors 
On the Board of Governors each Member State has one representative and an alternate 
governor. The Governor appointed shall be the minister responsible for finance in the 
MS and the alternate governor shall have full power to act on behalf of the Governor in 
his absence. (TEESM, 2012, Article 5) 
The Board of Governors has the authority to change the capital stock and adapt 
maximum lending value of the ESM and all other capital calls.  Furthermore, they have 
the final call on the choice of instruments and financial terms and conditions when 
financial assistance is given. Additionally, “The Board of Governors may review the list of 
financial assistance instruments provided for in Articles 14 to 18 and decide to make changes to it.” 
(TEESM, 2012, article 19) This paragraph opens the door for changes or additions to the 
financial assistance tool box in the future by way of mutual agreement making the ESM 
flexible for changing scenarios. The Board of Governors appoint the Chairperson, the 
Vice-Chairperson, Managing Director, the Board of director and their duties. To put in 
plainly, the Board of Governors has the executive final say on all matters within the 
ESM. (TEESM, 2012, Article 6) 
Decision making in the ESM  
On the Board of Governors and Directors decisions are taken by mutual agreement, 
qualified majority voting or simple majority voting depending on the proposal in 
question. In order for a decision to pass at least 2/3 of ESM Members holding a 
minimum of 2/3 of the allocated shares must be present. Abstention from voting does 
not prevent the adoption from being passed. Furthermore, mutual agreement requires 
unanimity; qualified majority voting is set at 80% to pass and simple majority equals 
50,1%. (TEESM, 2012, Article 4) 
However, this does not entail a system of one member one vote. The voting share is 
determined by the financial contribution to the ESM emphasising the intergovernmental 
nature of the institution. The weight granted to each country is explained in the table in 
the next section. Seeing as there are different voting procedures it is very important, 
which voting procedure is used in the different areas. Naturally, the most delicate areas 
are covered by unanimity in the Board of Governors, including issuing shares, making 
capital calls, changing the lending volume, changing the instruments available to the ESM 
and even providing financial support via ESM (TEESM, 2012, Article 5(6)). The Board 
of Governors is, as explained in the preceding section, comprised by delegates from the 
participating Member States, and seeing as key decisions, like whether or not to provide 
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assistance, requires unanimity each country enjoys significant power essentially 
eliminating the possibility for large countries, like Germany and France, to steamroll the 
smaller members. Both the Treaty on the Functioning of The European Union (TFEU) 
article 136 and TEESM, 2012 article 12(1) emphasise the ‘strict conditionality’ needing to 
be imposed on the beneficiary of assistance, but other than that, the instruments used 
and the nature of the conditionality is open as long as it is detailed in the MoU. (TEESM, 
2012, Article 5(6,f)) 
Capital Stock & Contribution Key 
The accumulated authorised capital stock is €700.000 million. The €700.000 million is 
divided into 7 million shares having a nominal value of €100.000 each. These shares are 
divided into paid-in shares and call able shares. This means that the entire €700.000 
million will not be collected initially only the pre-paid funds amounting to €80.000 
million are instantly available. Each ESM Member has irrevocably and unconditionally 
promised to provide their contribution to the combined capital stock in accordance with 
contribution key seen below. 
Table 3 
Contribution)Key)and)subscription)to)authorised)capital)stock)
" ESM"Key" Number"of"Shares" Capital"Subscription"
Germany" 27,15%" "1.900.248""""" €"190.024.800.000"
France" 20,39%" "1.427.013""""" €"142.701.300.000"
Italy" 17,91%" "1.253.959""""" €"125.395.900.000"
Spain" 11,90%" "833.259""""" €"83.325.900.000"
Netherlands" 5,72%" "400.190""""" €"40.019.000.000"
Belgium" 3,48%" "243.397""""" €"24.339.700.000"
Greece" 2,82%" "197.169""""" €"19.716.900.000"
Austria" 2,78%" "194.838""""" €"19.483.800.000"
Portugal" 2,51%" "175.644""""" €"17.564.400.000"
Finland" 1,97%" "125.818""""" €"12.581.800.000"
Ireland" 1,59%" "111.454""""" €"11.145.400.000"
Slovakia" 0,82%" "57.680""""" €"5.768.000.000"
Slovenia" 0,43%" "29.932""""" €"2.993.200.000"
Luxembourg" 0,25%" "17.528""""" €"1.752.800.000"
Cyprus" 0,20%" "13.734""""" €"1.373.400.000"
Estonia" 0,19%" "13.020""""" €"1.302.000.000"
Malta" 0,07%" "5.117""""" €"511.700.000"
Total) 100%) )7.000.000))))) €)700.000.000.000)
Source:(TEESM,(2012,(Annex(I(&(Annex(II(
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On the left we find the percentage of the €700.000 million promised each of the ESM 
members defining the allocation of voting shares held by each member and on the right 
we see the number of shares and real capital subscription.  
Though the Board of Governors only reside over the €80.000 million initially they may 
call in authorised unpaid capital and determine the deadline for this payment. This can 
happen if the pre-paid capital stock is reduced due to losses on loans. Furthermore, the 
Board of Governors change the maximum authorised capital stock, currently €700.000 
million, if it finds the need to do so.  
Application & Lending Procedure 
There are two options when the ESM provides financial assistance. In the first scenario 
an ESM Member applies for financial assistance to avoid bankruptcy and to continue 
payments on its foreign debt. The ESM may also embark upon a specific re-capitalisation 
of the financial sector of a Member state, as is the case in Spain. 
When a Member State applies for a loan from the ESM a series of new institutions enter 
the picture. First the Commission and the ECB asses the current risk to the financial 
stability of the Eurozone and the MS in question. Technical advice is obtained from IMF 
on whether or not the public debt of the applicant is sustainable thereby determining the 
concrete financing needs of the ESM Member concerned. (TEESM, 2012, article 13) 
On the basis of the recommendations formulated by the Commission, ECB and 
wherever possible the IMF, now knowing the estimated size of the loan and gravity of 
the situation, the Board of Governors can give the go ahead to further develop the actual 
macro-economic instruments and financial support needed in the form of a financial 
assistance facility agreement (FFA). The FFA concerns the legal foundation, financial 
terms and choice of instruments. (TEESM, 2012, Article 13) 
The next step is to formulate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The MoU is a 
detailed document containing the conditionality’s attached to the financial assistance 
facility. The MoU focuses on the weaknesses to be addressed be they public debt, the 
structure of the financial system or public system and lay out the changes thought needed 
and the instruments to be used. All programs, conditions and instrument are developed 
and formulated by the Commission, the ECB and ‘where ever possible’ the IMF 
(TEESM, 2012, Article 13(7)), together with IMF. However the instruments and 
conditions formulated take their departure in the previous experiences of the IMF. 
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Private sector financial assistance shall be in accordance with IMF practice on macro-
economic adjustment programs. “The ESM will coordinate very closely with the International 
Monetary (IMF) in providing stability support” (TEESM, 2012, p.5). Furthermore, the active 
involvement of IMF will be sought both when developing macro-economic programs 
and at the financial level and any state applying for ESM assistance shall as a rule present 
a similar request to the IMF. (TEESM, 2012) The Commission, ECB and the IMF also 
have the role of monitoring compliance with the macro-economic programs of the 
individual MS. 
As described, all the calculations and economic strategies of the MoU and the FFA is the 
work of institutions outside the ESM. When giving a loan the role of the Board of 
Governors, the financial ministers of the Eurozone, is one of executive decision-making 
and capital assessments. This is not to say that ESM does not hold great power, because 
it does. The ESM is the institutionalisation of interests of both periphery and core 
countries and the justification of political actions such as disbursing German taxpayer 
money to Greek banks and demanding macro-economic adjustment programs resulting 
in extensive cutback in public spending.  
If disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the ESM treaty between 
ESM Member or a Member and the ESM is placed under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. (TEESM, 2012, Article 37) 
Financial Assistance Instruments 
The ESM has four financial assistance instruments: Financial assistance through loans, 
primary market intervention, secondary market intervention and the collective action 
clause. The four instruments can be used to obtain different results and reactions but all 
have conditionality’s attached in the form financial terms and conditions presented in 
FFA and macro-economic adjustment programs formulated in the MoU. As presented 
earlier, the Board of Governors can, if unanimously agreed, add to the toolbox available 
to the ESM.  
Loans 
The ESM holds the competence to grant two types of loans. The first is a loan given to a 
member state for the purpose of dealing with public debt and expenditures that have 
reached unsustainable levels and are of a magnitude endangering the entire Eurozone. 
The second possibility is that the Board of Governors may decide to grant financial 
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assistance “for the specific purpose of re-capitalising the financial institution of that ESM Member” 
(TEESM, 2012, Article 15, p. 31). 
Primary market intervent ion 
The Board of Governors may decide to arrange for the purchase of bonds of an ESM 
Member on the primary market, in accordance with Article 12 and with the objective of 
maximising the cost efficiency of the financial assistance. (TEESM, 2012, article 15). The 
Board of Governors has the authority to purchase bonds from an ESM Member on the 
primary market, meaning directly from the MS, with the objective of maximising the cost 
efficiency of the financial assistance. (TEESM, 2012, article 17)  
This specific competence is entirely new as it was previously prohibited for by the no-
bailout principle according to which “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments.... A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments” (TFEU, 2010: article 125, p.101). This is the reason why 
the ESM is not based on Article 122 concerning economic measures of solidarity but 
based on article 136 concerning the functioning of the economic and monetary union. 
(TFEU, 2010, article 136; Christova, 2011). 
Secondary market intervent ion 
“Decisions on interventions on the secondary market to address contagion shall be taken on the basis of 
an analysis of the ECB recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks 
to financial stability” (TEESM, 2012 Art. 18, p. 35). 
Contagion is a situation where a faltering economy in one country causes otherwise 
healthy economies in another country to have problems. Contagion often has the hardest 
impact on direct and regional neighbours. Given the interconnectedness of the Eurozone 
economies, as presented in the chapter The economic climate in the Eurozone, this 
instrument allows the ESM to buy government bonds on the secondary market to avoid 
state bankruptcy should a massive dumping of bonds occur.  
In the Guidelines on intervention in the secondary market published by the EFSF in November 
2011 the goal was to ensure ‘appropriate price formation’ of government bonds in the 
debt market meaning that when yields are pushed to unsustainable heights due 
exceptional circumstances. This is done through buying up bonds thus keeping the 
interest rate at a rate were the country is not pushed out of the market. (EFSF, 2011) 
Additionally, by using secondary market intervention the ESM shows that it is 
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determined to protect the members thus heightening confidence in the national market 
and undercutting speculation giving the ESM a crisis preventing ability. (Ibid) 
Collec t ive  Act ion Clause 
Starting from January 2013 Collective Action Clauses (CAC’s) shall be included in all 
new Eurozone government bonds. The purpose of the CAC is to be able to find an 
agreement with the majority of its creditors on a restructuring/write-down of the debt 
without a minority being able to block the agreement. The CAC’s will be used if ESM 
assesses that loans will not be a sustainable solution for the member state economy and 
that in order to turn the odds a “haircut” or reduction of debt has to occur. The decision 
to allow for such measure will be taken on a case-by-case basis. (TEESM, 2012) 
Up until now, systemic banks facing bankruptcy have been bailed out forcing 
governments transforming bad private debt into public debt.   
“When a creditor lends money to a debtor making a wrong assessment of his creditworthiness, he must 
face the consequences in the form of a financial loss.” (Christova, 2011: p.55) 
The CAC introduces a new way of restructuring government debt in a fashion known 
from the private markets where debtor and creditors, when facing bankruptcy under the 
current arrangement, negotiate new terms that benefit both parties. The CAC has the 
potential to be an important tool for the ESM and is definitely a move towards spreading 
the financial loses in the current and future economic crises. (Ibid) 
The four financial assistance instruments are designed to address different crisis 
scenarios and enable the ESM to make case-by-case assessment and determine the 
appropriate reaction. The influence of ESM interaction on the financial- and debt 
markets is potentially extensive covering both short and long-term assistance and market 
confidence adjusting abilities. This makes the ESM an important institution for both 
current and future Europe.  
Pricing Policy 
“When granting stability support, the ESM shall aim to fully cover its financing and operating costs and 
shall include an appropriate margin” (TEESM, 2012, Article 20, p. 20). Beyond covering the 
costs of operation and financing the formulation an appropriate margin gives us little clue as 
to what to expect, but this will further investigated and discussed later in the analysis. 
Legal status, privileges and immunities 
We now take to determining the legal position of ESM and its level of accountability.  
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In section 3 of article 32 in TEESM, 2012 it is clearly stated that any property, funding or 
assets, wherever located and held by whoever enjoy immunity from all and every form of 
judicial process except for situations where the ESM itself explicitly has authorised such 
action. This includes contracts and documentation of funding instruments between the 
ESM and its Members. Nor can ESM property be searched, confiscated, expropriated or 
seized under any circumstances. This also goes for the ESM archives.  
Additionally, “To the extend necessary to carry out the activities provided in this treaty, all property, 
funding and assets of the ESM shall be free from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria of any 
nature” (TEESM, 2012, Article 32(8)).  
Furthermore, all persons working within the ESM are subject professional secrecy and 
are immune to legal proceedings in relation to acts performed in their official capacity. 
It is clear that the ESM is a sovereign institution and reports to no institution higher than 
itself. Documentation on key matters such as the macro-economic adjustment programs 
formulated in the MoU and the FFA is publically available. However, ESM holds no 
obligation to uphold a minimum level of transparency of its actions or official 
documents to the public further underlining the independent nature of the institution.   
It is evident that the Autonomy of the ESM is second to none and that its actions while 
in pursuit of it declared purpose:  “Mobilize funding and provide stability support under strict 
conditionality” (TEESM, 2012, Article 3), are to be subjugated to the authority of no one 
but itself reaffirming its independent legal status.  
The Memorandum of Understanding and the Financial Assistance Facility 
Agreement 
The memorandum of understanding is one of the key documents in the proceedings 
when providing financial assistance to a given country. The importance of the document 
is underlined in TEESM, 2012 article 13 on the proceedings for granting assistance. In 
subparagraph 3 it is stated that the MoU is to be developed by the Commission in liaison 
with the ECB, if possible the IMF and of course the ESM member concerned. The final 
document will contain an assessment of the severity of the economic problems alongside 
a description of the financial instruments the Commission, ECB, and possibly IMF plan 
on using (TEESM, 2012, Article 13(3)). Additionally, the conditionality attached to the 
ESM loans “(..) shall be contained in a macro-economic adjustment program detailed in the MoU”, 
(TEESM, 2012, Article 16, p.33) This is not to say the ESM is a powerless institution in 
determining the content of the MoU. The Board of Governors will have significant 
impact as unanimity is required, in accordance with article 5(6,f), when approving the 
 43 
economic policy conditionality in the MoU and when establishing the choice of 
instruments and terms and conditions described in article 12 through 18. Naturally article 
13 falls in this interval, essentially empowering the Board of Governors to approve the 
conditionality in the MoU by unanimity, thereby allowing representatives from the 
Eurozone finance ministries to get a decisive say on the macro-economic adjustment 
programmes. (TEESM, 2012, Article 5(6,f)) 
The Financial Assistance Facility Agreement 
The financial assistance facility agreement is the document, which specifies the financial 
terms of an ESM loan. Technicalities such as the interest rate, maturity of the loan and 
the disbursement of tranches of assistance are described in the FFA (TEESM, 2012, 
article 16). In essence, the FFA is the legal document concerning the “banking” side of 
the ESM. We will go into further detail on the FFA in the chapter The Financial 
Assistance Facility Agreement. 
Sub-Conclusion 
This chapter was aimed at explaining the institutional construct of the ESM in order to 
determine the competences, power and structure of the mechanism finally enabling us to 
assess the causal potential it holds. Whereas any financial assistance facilitated by ESM 
will have to be followed by ‘strict conditionality’ there are no specific measures listed, 
giving the Commission, ECB & IMF the responsibility to determine the severity of the 
situation and thereby the strictness of the conditionality imposed. The adjustment 
program, including the conditionality, will be described in the MoU and signed by the 
involved parties, pending unanimous approval by the Board of Governors representing 
each country in the Eurozone.  
The ESM is in itself only empowered to provide financial assistance in the form of direct 
loans or intervention in the primary or secondary bond market and activating the CAC. 
Once again, the Board of Governors can expand the tools available to the mechanism if 
necessary and if unanimously agreed upon.  
On the face of it then, the role of the ESM is quite small, seeing as the trifecta of the 
Commission, ECB and IMF draw up the very critical MoU, whereas the ESM will 
function as a mechanism for facilitating the actual assistance to the distressed member. 
However, as the MoU will only enter into effect pending unanimous approval from the 
Board of Governors each and every country possesses significant bargaining power 
simply by threat of non-agreement. The necessary consensus combined with no specific 
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restrictions on conditionality make the ESM very adaptable to the differing challenges 
facing different countries. A change of approach is nonetheless depending on the 
Commission, ECB and IMF, specifically their perception of the situation and the 
economic ideals they aspire to. 
The Analytical Focal Point 
In the table below we have united the macro-economic schools of Monetarist and Euro-
Realist presented in the theory chapter with the macro-economic imbalances identified in 
the chapter on the economic climate in the Eurozone. The table shows how the two 
schools would use the competences of the ESM identified in the treaty analysis to, in 
accordance with our problem formulation, encompass the imbalances within the EMU. 
The ESM is of course limited somewhat by the treaty, which will show itself in the 
measures available. It is not possible for ESM to impose itself on other countries than 
the one receiving financial assistance, meaning any new, or additions to existing, 
supranational measures, are out of reach. Further more the Fiscal Compact and the anti-
inflationary nature of ECB put certain restraints on the possibilities as well. Any 
measures taken is done through the MoU setting the guidelines for the macro-economic 
adjustment programme, and it has to be approved by the Board of Governors by 
unanimity, which can lead to compromises. However, other than the requirement of strict 
conditionality, the MoU is not very restricted, and is based on an assessment by the 
Commission with help from the ECB and if possible the IMF. Seeing as the Fiscal 
Compact binds the Commission, the overall target is predetermined to be consolidation 
of the public budget. Within these restrictions we believe the two theoretical approaches 
we have chosen would find the measures described in Table 4, as being desirable 
 
Table 4 
Imbalance Euro-Monetarist Solution Euro-Realist Solution 
Macro-economic imbalances 
! Unemployment  
! Unit labour cost 
! Balance of Payments 
Use the MoU to impose an internal 
devaluation by making a labour 
market reforms aimed at increasing 
competition on the labour market. 
 
Use the MoU to, restrain wages once 
the public investments have 
improved the unemployment-rate 
and productivity-level in combination 
with the productivity increase 
stemming from the public 
investments.  
National accounts 
! Public Budget deficit  
! Public debt 
Use the MoU to impose public 
budget cutbacks on expenditure to 
minimise the public deficit and debt. 
Use the MoU to increase domestic 
demand through public investment 
in sectors that can improve 
productivity.  
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The measures presented in table 4 are naturally different to the ones we presented in our 
theoretical chapter, due to the restrictions presented above. They are differing more in 
the euro-realist sector, as the theoretically optimal solutions would require competences 
not conferred to the ESM, whereas the Euro-monetarist approach appears more 
ingrained in TEESM and the surrounding legislation. Especially the Fiscal Compact 
severely limits the Euro-realist approach, as there are severe restrictions on the budgets 
that have already been breached in the countries receiving assistance. The Fiscal 
Compact does allow for violations in shorter periods of time due to exceptional 
circumstances, and the Commission determines the time-period. (Fiscal Compact, Article 
1(b) & Article 3(b)) Whereas the ESM is not enabled to directly fund any expansive fiscal 
policy, it could potentially demand it through the MoU, leading us to believe that it is 
indeed possible, however unlikely it may seem, for the ESM to enforce shorter-term 
investments in certain sectors.  
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The Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement & 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Introduction 
In the following chapter we go deeper into the two contracts that provide the legal basis 
for financial assistance and the conditionality attached. The MoU determines the 
guidelines for the macro-economic adjustment programs attached to the recapitalisation 
of the financial sector in Spain exemplified in the Spanish Budget Plan 2013-2014, which 
will be analysed in the coming chapter. The FFA determines the size and use of the 
financial loan itself and the legal basis for the banking aspect of the recapitalisation. 
Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement 
The amendment clearly states that any payment of loans from the mechanism will be 
subject to strict conditionality. In conducting our analysis these conditions become 
essential. There are in essence two important documents laying down the framework for 
payment of loans, the Master Financial Assistance Facility agreement describing the legal 
framework for the functioning of the assistance and the Memorandum of Understanding 
more clearly presenting the macro-economic adjustment programs and conditions 
attached to the loan. Both documents need a signature from key actors.4 
In the following paragraphs we seek to highlight certain elements of the financial 
assistance facility agreement (FFA) made for recapitalisation of the Spanish banking-
system with relevance for our specific purpose. 
 
It is important to note that the FFA was written and signed before ESM was finalised, 
meaning EFSF conducted the first part of the recapitalisation, however, as stated in 
article 1(4) the financial assistance is transferred to ESM when available. Furthermore the 
ESM is enabled to amend the FFA in accordance with the institutional and 
administrative setting of the ESM.  
The agreement 
The size is limited at €100bn, but no provision requires the entire amount to be utilised 
(Article 2(1)). Of course, if necessary the member state will be able to apply for more 
funding, this have to be approved by the ECB, Commission and if applicable the IMF as 
                                                
4 Commission, ECB, EBA, Board of Governors and the Spanish Autorities 
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well (Article 2(5)). The financial assistance is regarded as general sovereign debt (Article 
5(2)), the EFSF does not inject money, but rather provides a loan to a government in 
need fully expecting the amount to be repaid. The interest rate will be equal to the 
applicable interest rate in each period and a commitment fee will be added. Whereas the 
recapitalisation is kept on the Spanish governments books, the Spanish government will 
have little say over how the money is spent. As emphasised in article 2(a) in Schedule 1 
of the FFA the funds are transferred to the “(..) Beneficiary Member State solely to provide 
finance to FROB (..)”. The receiving government will thusly be liable for the funds, but a 
special purpose entity is responsible for assisting the institutions in most dire need of 
help. We will go into further detail on the FROB in our chapter, The Spanish 
Memorandum of Understanding.  
The specific conditionality with regards to regulatory reform and the individual 
institutions is not included in the FFA, as the document is merely meant as the judicial 
framework allowing for actual supranational intervention in regulating the institutions. 
The FROB is free to use the funds as it sees fit, following the guidelines of the FFA and 
the MoU, after the relevant actors have signed these documents. The FFA plays the role 
of actually transferring national sovereignty into supranational territory. As described in 
Article 3, this transfer of power is pending signature from both national and 
supranational actors on several documents including the MoU, and consent from not 
only ESM and the receiving country, but seeing as ESM is intergovernmental in nature, 
from all guarantors (including all Eurozone countries) (Article 3). 
There are only few specific conditions attached to FROB in the FFA, such as a 
maximum average maturity on the financial assistance of 12,5 years and 15 years for an 
individual loan (Schedule 1, Article 2(e)). Furthermore the manner in which capital 
injections is allowed to be undertaken is limited as well in article Schedule 1, article 2 as 
well.  
In order to efficiently recapitalise the different banks, information is essential, naturally 
the MS and FROB are required to supply all relevant information on assets and other 
relevant factors needed to perform audits etc. This is described in article 10&11. In 
essence, the banks, the Spanish ministry of finance and other relevant institutions in the 
beneficiary country are under obligation to supply any and all documents in needed by 
the financial assistance facilities. The wording is open-ended: “any […] information 
reasonably needed […] or required to be delivered […] by the terms of the MoU.” (Article 10(1)(e)). 
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Furthermore, quarterly reports on the progress on the requirements in the MoU are also 
to be published (Article 10(1)(b)).  
Summary of the FFA 
When a member state, in this case Spain, apply for a loan upon signing the FFA the ESM 
dictates the disbursement on the basis of recommendations from the Commission and 
ECB. The loan will figure as public debt but the competence to divide the capital itself 
lies with the ESM. This allocates great authority to the supranational level and de facto 
makes the ESM an active actor in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the extensive 
competences to acquire any and all documents relevant from both public and private 
institutions cements the hierarchy and economic power the ESM hold over a MS who 
obtains a loan from the European Stability Mechanism. With the FFA the ESM holds 
hegemonic status and authority over recapitalisation of debtors, Spain has to conform its 
financial policies to the ESM not the other way around.  
The Spanish Memorandum of Understanding 
In this chapter the broader terms of the MoU is examined. Through the previous chapter 
it is evident that the MoU is a document containing the macroeconomic adjustment 
programme that needs to be fulfilled, in order to be granted a loan through ESM. Along 
with the MoU, an FFA is devised. The understanding of the MoU is in this paper 
presented in order to understand the framework of FFA. 
 
 In the previous chapter it was stated that 70% of the Spanish debt, was created within 
the financial and non-financial corporations. Spain has with the signing of the MoU 
committed them self to consult the EC and ECB on adoption on financial sector 
policies, that are not included in the MoU. IMF in this matter fulfils a role as the EC and 
ECBs technical adviser (Spanish MoU, 2012). The Spanish MoU addresses the 
imbalances of the banking sector, as the public was affected by a credit-driven domestic 
demand, that was particular vulnerable to the global financial and economic crisis of 
2007-2008. The reason that the credit-driven demand became a possibility was due to 
low interest rates, that in Spain led to investments in the real estate and construction 
sector (Spanish MoU, 2012). But the withdrawal of investments within this sector led to 
increasing unemployment in Spain, which is evident through the fact that in 2006 the 
unemployment rate was 8,5%. Six years later in 2012 this number was at an alarming 
25% (Eurostat - Unemployment rate 2001-2012). The increased unemployment led to a 
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rapidly increasing public debt due to the fact that Spain lost tax income and increased 
expenditure through social benefits. That the Spanish public debt has been increasing is 
evident if comparing the public debt from 2006, where it was 39,7% of the GDP, to 
2012 where it had rose to 84,2% (Eurostat - Public debt).  
 
In the Spanish MoU the focal point is to repair the Spanish banking sector by identifying 
the weak banks, and determining which banks that were in need of financial support 
from the state. It is the Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria or the fund for orderly 
bank restructuring (FROB) that was tasked with spearheading this operation. The FROB 
is a Spanish state-owned institution, and is partially financed through the General State 
Budget, and therefore its capital changes from year to year. The ESM contribution to the 
FROB is close €39bn with a safety of up to €100bn over a time period of 12.5 years 
(Esm.europa.eu - Financial assistance for Spain). The FROB law 9/2012, along with the 
Spanish MoU, contains the detailed framework on how to reconstruct and bailout the 
banking sector in Spain. The main criteria from FROB law and the MoU are to downsize 
unprofitable business. In the Spanish MoU it is stated: 
 "The restructuring plans of the banks requiring public funds will have to  demonstrate 
 that the long-term viability of the bank can be ensured without  continuing State aid." (Spanish 
MoU: p. 8) 
 
This statement is rather important because it emphasise that the Spanish authorities will 
only grant a loan on the basis that the bank in the long-term is able to continue without 
state aid. Therefore banks need to contribute as much as possible to the restructuring, 
and consequently needs to de-risk by downsizing their unprofitable business, which 
means selling of their impaired assets. The impaired assets are to be transferred to 
SAREB5, which is partly owned and financed by the FROB, and these actions are 
intended to reduce the riskiness within the financial sector. It was assumed that it would 
help it regain its competiveness, and therefore minimise the cost to the taxpayers 
(Spanish MoU, 2012). 
With the MoU Spain had to address the excessive deficit, which the country has faced 
after the financial crisis struck. This based on the Councils recommendation of Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), which states that Spain should gradually reduce their deficit in 
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GDP to 6,3% in 2012 4,5% in 2013 and 2,8% in 2014 (Spanish MoU). The way this is to 
be formed can be read out of the following:  
 
"Spanish authorities should present by end-July 2012 a multi-annual budgetary plan 
for 2013-14, which fully specifies the structural measures that are necessary to achieve 
the correction of the excessive deficit. Provisions of the Budgetary Stability Law regarding 
transparency and control of budget execution should be fully implemented" (Spanish 
MoU: p.15).  
 
The Budget Plan is the primary macro-economic adjustment program, and contains the 
conditions necessary to achieve the target of budgetary discipline and stability for the 
purpose of financing the bailout of the banking sector, and correct the macroeconomic 
imbalances. This is to be done through the initiatives from the budgetary plan for 2013-
2014 based on the recommendations of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP). 
In the MIP some areas are targeted. For example, Spain is to correct its taxation system, 
along with its fiscal policies to support growth. It is to reduce taxes for home-ownership, 
and for the ones experiencing indebtedness. The reform of the labour market is partially 
detailed in the Budget Plan and Pacto de Toledo. Spain is furthermore to eliminate barriers 
when doing business, and to expand their electricity and gas interconnection with their 
neighboring countries (Spanish MoU, 2012). The Council is tasked with reviewing the 
budgetary plan on a regular basis (Spanish MoU, 2012).   
The Spanish MoU has put up general requirements on financial institutions, the public 
sector and labor market reforms. The MoU does not go into further detail, but leaves the 
implementation of these guidelines to the Spanish government through a budget-plan 
under supervision of the European Council. Given that the Budget Plan must be 
approved by the Council and made on the basis of the MoU, which has the be approved 
by the Board of Governors, we are able to look at the Budget Plan as the actual 
implementation of the conditionality attached to ESM. The actual judicial framework, for 
instance the transfer of competences to ESM and its involved actors, is established in the 
FFA. 
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Conditions on the Spanish Financial Sector 
Even though the primary target for austerity, as we will show in the chapter on the 
conditions on the Spanish budget, is the public and private sector through the Spanish 
budget plan, the financial assistance provided is channelled through FROB into the 
failing financial sector in Spain. Due to the technically advanced nature of regulating 
large transnational financial institutions as well as the fact that little attention has been 
devoted hereto in the FROB has resulted in us largely ignoring this aspect in our analysis 
of a viable alternative to the approach by ESM.  
 
In our description of FROB we conclude that it is primarily used as a technical solution 
for recapitalisation of the banking-sector, with little purpose other than offloading bad 
assets in the least painful way. In essence, if a banks balance sheet is not in immediate 
danger, it is left alone, with little added regulatory framework. The only specific 
requirement on the financial sector augured in the MoU is a temporary equity 
requirement of 9% enforced at least until 2014 (Spanish MoU, 2012) Other than that the 
measures are primarily aimed at increasing transparency and slightly improving the 
supervisory abilities of Banco de España. (ibid.)  
 
When we still feel obliged to dedicate a small section of our project to regulation of the 
financial sector it is due to the key-role finance has played in the lead-up to the on-going 
recession, as we show in our chapter The economic climate in the Eurozone. We 
conclude that the highly interconnected financial sectors have enabled huge financial 
inflows resulting in cheap capital. In Spain, financial corporations are responsible for 
45% of the total external debt of 165% of GDP. By comparison, all other private sectors 
are responsible for 37%. (Lapavitsas et.al, 2012) There is no doubt then, that the 
financial sector has contributed to worsening the situation currently experienced in 
Spain, without coming under particular scrutiny when accepting the financial assistance, 
at least not in direct context with ESM.  
 
The recapitalisation is in the first instance financed by capital guaranteed by the 
participating countries in the Eurozone, but seeing as the funding is accounted as part of 
the Spanish debt it does indeed appear as if the old mantra, as presented in Beck, 
Todorov and Wagner (2013); “banks are international in life and national in death” holds true 
in this instance as well. We believe the important role the financial sector played 
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combined with the fact they account for almost half the external Spanish debt entitles it 
to a(n) (dis)honourable mention and reflections on the prospects of regulation 
preventing history repeating itself once the economy in the Eurozone improves are 
indeed justified.  
 
In this context a trilemma occurs, as there is an inherent incompatibility between 
financial integration, financial stability and national sovereignty in banking regulation. 
(Beck, Todorov & Wagner, 2013; Pisany-Ferri & Sapir, 2013) If further empirical studies 
of the situation in Spain verify this ‘trilemma’, two options are available to increase 
financial stability in the financial sector. Either a move towards more national financial 
systems with limited cross-border reach or a supranational supervisory institutional 
structure. (Beck, Todorov & Wagner, 2013) In the MoU, what little supervisory 
initiatives are described primarily concern enhancing procedures available to Banco de 
España. (Spanish MoU, 2012) It does not appear as if the Commission and ECB, when 
writing the MoU envisioned it being used to strengthen supranational regulation of the 
banking sector to any serious extent.  
 
We cannot exclude the possibility that the existing supranational has been well-equipped 
to handle large transnational banks failing but Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010), in their 
empirical analysis of the EU response the same problem, conclude that the existing 
institutional arrangements to manage a banking crisis were ‘clearly sub-optimal’. 
The interconnectedness of the financial institutions combined with the lacking 
institutional capabilities could indeed call for increased supranational supervision, if the 
financial sector is envisioned to stay highly interconnected, especially if the ‘trilemma’ we 
presented can withstand further testing. 
 
Recently there has emerged concern that Spanish bank has resorted to a strategy known 
as ‘delay and pray’, by affording troubled counterparties refinancing, even when there is 
little chance they will ever be able to repay the claim. Spanish Banks have reportedly 
refinanced 14% of their loan book amounting to more than €200bn, while treating 40% 
of the claims as if they were acting normally. (Gordon, 2013; Buck, 2013) 
 
Of course, only time will tell if this ‘delay and pray’ tactic is true, and if it is, if it will 
work, but it does emphasise the need for reflections on whether or not to establish an 
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institutional framework not characterised as ‘sub-optimal’ to contribute to long-term 
stability. With this section we do not wish to claim the procedure of handing out 
financial assistance using the ESM should necessarily a shift supervisory and regulatory 
responsibilities from national institutions to supranational counterparts. To that end we 
are neither technically qualified nor empirically prepared to stake such claims. We merely 
want to highlight that the interconnectedness of financial institutions merits such a 
debate, as the existing regulation has not been able to prevent nor mitigate the current 
situation.  
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Conditions on the Spanish Budget 
Introduction 
As was stated in the Analysis of the Competences the treaty amendment effectively 
enabling the existence of the ESM, requires that any loan given to member states in 
economic distress would have to be followed by strict conditionality on said country. To 
assess the way in which this conditionality functions in practice we are going to pick 
through the conditions applied to the bailout of the Spanish financial sector. Although 
the ESMs predecessor, the EFSF, managed the bailout, the amendments made to the 
FFA when taken over by the ESM were minimal, contributing to our belief that basing 
our analysis on the bailout in Spain is not without merit. With that in mind we are going 
to conduct an analysis of the key conditions imposed on Spain, to detect the economic 
thinking behind it to be able to credibly conduct a critical analysis of the practices of the 
ESM. The Budget plan for Spain has its focus on correcting fiscal policies, and creating 
structural reforms. It is these two approaches, which is going to be examined in the 
following chapter. 
An analysis of the Budget Plan 
It will come as no surprise to most any reader that the conditionality on governments 
receiving EU bailouts are met with austerity measures. It is the nature of these measures 
we are going to analyse in this chapter.  As we have already described the context of the 
crisis we are not going to go into further detail on the morass that the Spanish 
government finds itself in, but rather turn our attention to the specific conditions and the 
economic reasoning behind.  
 
In its essence the macro-economic adjustments in the Budget Plan are double sided. 
First, fiscal consolidation is deemed necessary, which is followed by further structural 
reforms in key sectors. The fiscal consolidation is aimed at reducing the public deficit 
thereby containing the growth in public debt and in effect enhancing the markets trust in 
the Spanish government, leading to lower interest rates. The key in this respect is to 
enhance credibility in the short to medium term by ensuring budgetary sustainability in 
all aspects of the public sector ranging from the central government over the 
autonomous regions and including the local entities and social security programmes 
(Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). Secondly, the structural reforms have a longer-term 
perspective and while completion are not deemed as pressing they are indeed considered 
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needed in order to better the potential for growth. The target is comprehensive reform 
of a wide array of areas including, but not limited, to major labour market reform, 
financial reform, streamlining of administrative structures and cutbacks in major policy 
areas such as education. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) The scope is not limited to the 
public sector, as it is recognised that private households and corporations hold 
considerable debt, initiatives are taken to further deleverage these entities as well 
(Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). 
The macroeconomic scenario 
The budget plan rests on a macroeconomic scenario forecasting a turn for the better in 
the Eurozone as a whole and indeed in Spain beginning in 2013. The Spanish 
improvement rests on an assumption that foreign demand will increase coinciding with a 
general recovery of the European economy. It was expected that the Spanish GDP was 
going to contract by 0,5% in 2012 before starting to expand in 2013 and 2014 by 1,2% 
and 1,4% respectively. Even though it is acknowledged that the austerity measures 
described in the Budget Plan will negatively impact the domestic demand, due to 
decreased purchasing power resulting from the wage-decrease and higher 
unemployment. The decreased domestic demand will be offset by an increase in foreign 
demand further strengthened by the internal devaluation through increased external 
competitiveness. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) Of course such predictions are fragile in 
nature and looking at the actual statistics for the year 2012 we see some inconsistencies. 
GDP contracted by 1,5% (Eurostat – Real GDP Growth Rate) rather than 0,5% in 2012 
and the expected unemployment rate was 24,6%, whereas in reality it reached 25% 
(Eurostat – Unemployment Rate).  
 
On this basis it would appear as if the recovery has been overestimated or the negative 
impact of the austerity measures has been underestimated, either way, this fundamental 
belief in the automatic medium-term recovery of the economy is a hallmark of neo-
classical economic thinking; as the decreasing interest rate on Spanish bonds due to 
increased confidence of the financial market and the restrain on wages will subsequently 
lower unit labour cost and boost export because of the improved competitive position 
creating domestic demand in Spain.  
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The intentional effects of the reform is stated in the budget plan as:    
“A lower risk premium (due to increased confidence generated by the reforms) accompanied by 
increased use of the flexibility mechanisms provided for by the labour-market reform, should 
improve confidence and support private consumption and investment” (Spanish Budget Plan, 
2012: p. 9).  
 
Here the monetarist causality is very clearly the basis for the argumentation and 
predictions. In line with our theory, the monetarist argumentation is that by decreasing 
the nominal wages, foreign investors see an incentive to invest within the borders of 
Spain again. Furthermore the austerity measures taken in the public sector in Spain, 
would be able to pay some of the expenditures associated with operation of the FROB, 
and at the same time secure fewer expenses in relation to social benefits. This would lead 
to a healthier national account in a monetarist approach.  
 
Financial consolidation 
As mentioned, the predominant objective is to bring down the public deficit in the short 
to medium term to reduce government debt. There are two obvious ways to achieve this; 
increasing income and limiting expenditure, both of which are being required in the 
budget plan. In 2013 there is to be a deficit of no more than 4,5% of GDP followed by a 
mere 2,8% in 2014 (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) bringing Spain within the limit in the 
SGP. Achieving this target is not a small task as the Spanish deficit in 2012 was 10,6% of 
GDP actually increasing from 9,4% of GDP in 2011 (Eurostat – General Government 
Deficit/Surplus). The severity of the cutbacks is acknowledged in the budget plan as 
having a short-term negative impact on growth; however, they are deemed necessary in 
order to restore confidence in the Spanish government as it is reckoned to have a 
positive impact on the current account balance leading to a decrease in foreign debt and 
decreasing demanded yields from foreign investors. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) 
As mentioned above the fiscal consolidation rests on increased tax revenue and a significant decrease in 
public expenses.  
 
Table 5 summarises the annual budget savings predicted with the Spanish Budget Plan in 
both expenditure and income. Furthermore it is intended to give an overview of the 
sectors in which the savings on the budget are going to be found.  
 
 57 
 
 
Table 5 
Area 2012 2013 2014 
Tax Measures 4,975 15,096 15,425 
Public Employment 5,425 3,723 5,372 
Employment 1,888 5,743 5,989 
Social Security 0,07 -1,040 -2,551 
Long Term care 0,16 1,391 1,473 
Central Government measures 0,6 3,700 6 
Autonomous Regions adjustment  6,867 12,862 
Local Administration adjustment & reform  3,500 5,5 
Total 13,118 39,956 50,075 
All numbers are in billion euros, source: Budget Plan p. 19   
 
As is evident in the table the majority of the savings in the short term is to come from 
cutbacks in public employment and increased tax revenue, whereas in the following years 
also the regions and local administration is going to be hit with quite severe cutbacks. 
Seeing as the Spanish GDP is projected to be €1.074,803bn (Eurostat – GDP and Main 
Components, Current Prices) in 2014 the measures amounting to approximately €50bn 
account for 4,7% of GDP. In the following sections the content of Table 5 is going to be 
examined further. 
  
First off there is a new tax collection structure, and with that a cascade of initiatives is to 
be taken in order to regain a competitive level. The tax measures taken in Spain will 
affect the personal income tax, which will be increased on basis of level of income. Also 
corporate tax regulation will be effectuated. The tax regulations are introduced to 
encourage companies to deleverage (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). The projected increased 
tax revenue is not insignificant. The measures taken are primarily indirect taxation and a 
higher corporate tax rate. The indirect taxation is focused through Value Added Taxes 
(VAT), which is going to be increased from 18 to 21% and the reduced rate from 8 to 
10%, some products are moved from the lower to the higher rate as well. Furthermore 
an excise duty is added on hydrocarbons, for instance a duty is to be applied to biofuels, 
which formerly were exempt from taxation (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). The idea of 
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increasing taxation is quite opposite to neo-classical reasoning, as it would be seen as 
distorting the market. However, in this case the monetarist preservation of the single 
currency trumps by focusing on the contribution of the increased taxes to the fiscal 
consolidation. The argumentation taking in the Spanish Plan is that:  
“This will bring Spain's tax collection structure closer into line with the European Union 
average, whilst boosting a fiscal devaluation mechanism that will contribute to boost the economic 
cycle and job creation (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012: p. 20) 
As seen in the Table 5 it is not only tax measures that need reformation. Also public 
employment is up for revision, and this sector is indeed hit by cutbacks. Here more than 
€14bn is saved in the 2012-2014 period. This is done primarily by two measures. First off 
the extra salary payment given to public employees in December is removed from 2012 
saving more than €5bn that year and secondly by enforcing a hiring freeze in the public 
sector in general saving in excess of €5bn in 2013-14. With the hiring freeze special terms 
are put up ensuring a 10% replacement rate for specific groups like teachers, nurses, the 
military and security bodies fighting tax and labour fraud (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). 
Aside from reducing wage-expenditures by reducing the number of public employees the 
hours worked per week will be slightly increased and the number of days off in lieu will 
be decreased as well. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) This will help alleviate the pressure on 
public service caused by the recruitment freeze.  
 
With the cutbacks in the public sector, the social benefits of the Spanish citizens are also 
affected. Here measures introduced are mainly related to employment security, lowering 
unemployment benefits and limiting the access to them, and thereby save on the budget. 
For instance the unemployment benefits have been reduced from the 7th month of 
unemployment and onwards by 50% along with removal of a special benefit for people 
aged 45 and older. Furthermore, calculation of asset income when calculating benefits 
has been introduced and monitoring of active job seeking has been improved (Spanish 
Budget Plan, 2012) These reforms have undoubtedly increased the level of financial 
strain on citizens collecting social security and that is the point. The argument is that 
these reforms further the incentive to work by reducing benefits when out of work, and 
that if there is not enough jobs for everybody the price of labour will fall until Spain’s 
competitive position is improved enough to increase export and there by creating new 
workplaces (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). This approach to lowering the ULC is definitely 
a monetarist approach, as they are to improve competiveness, by reducing wage-rigidity 
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and forcing the Spanish workers to accept lower income, fewer social benefits and longer 
working days.   
 
The budget plan will also have an effect on the long-term care, primarily impacting 
senior citizens and people that are long-term ill. The cutbacks over the period of 2012 to 
2014 is amounted to €1,4bn. The effects of these measures will be that user charge is 
introduced or increased. For instance by increasing the beneficiaries’ contribution from 
10 to 15%. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) This alleviates the government of expenditure 
putting it in the hands of the private user to pay for care.  
 
The Spanish people are to accept reforms in social security, which is not detailed in the 
budget plan, but rather in a plan called Pacto de Toledo. However, the main objective is to 
increase revenue from working people, for instance by increasing the surcharge for late 
payments, increase the retirement age and limit the access to partial retirement to avoid 
abuse of this. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) 
The infrastructure and housing sector is also going to be affected by the budget plan. But 
the revenue from this area is quite limited at a projected €175 and €230 million in 2013 
and 2014 respectively. The bulk of the money in the transport sector is going to come 
from removing a 7% subsidy on road tolls and liberalising passenger rail transport. 
(Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) Approximately €160 of the €230 million in 2014 are going 
to come from cuts in subsidies in the housing sector primarily in the form of aid to loans 
(Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). 
Autonomous regions and local administration 
Apart from increased tax revenue the largest impact on the budget is going to be found 
in the local administration and autonomous regions. The cutbacks are going to be 
distributed as follows: 
Table 6 
Area 2013 2014 
Specific Autonomous Region adjustment measures 0,600 3,600 
Autonomous Region Health & Education measures 6,267 9,267 
Local Administration reform & adjustment 3,500 5,500 
Total 10,367 18,367 
All numbers are billion euros accumulated, source: Spanish Budget Plan, 
2012: p. 43 
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The numbers are quite impressive; especially the health and education sectors are going 
to be hit hard. The measures in education and health care will take effect beginning in 
2012 and are widespread. Specifically in relation to education class size will be adjusted, 
the number of teaching advisors will be reduced and the teaching day will be increased. 
In health care pharmaceutical expenditures will be cut, prescription contribution by the 
user will be increased and spending on machinery limited. In general the working week 
will be increased from 35-37,5 hours, the number of temporary workers will be decreased 
and paid time off for union activity will be decreased significantly (Spanish Budget Plan, 
2012). 
Sub-Conclusion 
The Budget plan for 2013-2014 is one of austerity at best and cutbacks for the most. As 
shown the economic reason behind the plan comes from a monetarist paradigm with 
focus on supply as seen in the employment reform and fiscal consolidation restrain 
represented in the public administration rationalisation. Furthermore, according to the 
Budget Plan the short-term effects of the austerity strategy will fade quickly as export and 
private and market confidence reactivates growth already in 2013. 
 
“The effects of these reforms will be clearly apparent from 2013, coinciding with strengthened 
European recovery, which will support a gradual recovery in the Spanish economy from the 
following year. A lower risk premium (due to increased confidence generated by the reforms) 
accompanied by increased use of the flexibility mechanisms provided for by the labour-market 
reform, should improve confidence and support private consumption and investment. 
Furthermore, the internal devaluation process and reforms will indirectly favour exports, through 
increased external competitiveness and increased GDP potential in all its components: Total 
Factor Productivity, capital and labour.” (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012: p. 9) 
 
There is not one area of investment, only cutbacks and cultivation of efficiency in the 
public sector. The Budget Plan will affect every age group, young, old and in-between, 
fortunately these hard times will be short-lived if the causal explanation above holds true. 
The causal argument rely on both lowering the ULC and strengthening the private and 
market confidence but the factor that is pivotal for success is the coinciding economic 
growth in EU as a whole. Without considerable economic growth across the single 
market the reliance on internal devaluation as the key to fiscal consolidation and recovery 
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in the labor market can prove ill chosen. Additionally, there is no trace of public 
investments of any kind; this cements the monetarist nature of the Budget Plan.  
 
Figure 13 
 
Looking at Figure 13 we see that the EU growth has not recovered and neither has the 
domestic demand increased. In fact the EU27 growth rate has kept falling from 2010 and 
has stagnated at 0,1% while the domestic demand has fallen 4% just in the period 2012 
to 2013. The economic prediction of the Spanish budget plan that would be “clearly 
apparent in 2013” (Ibid, p.9), seems clearly wrong. 
 
The improved macro-economic figures predicted as a consequence of Budget Plan 2013-
2014 are seen in the Table 7.  
Table 7 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Public Budget Deficit 
% of GDP 
-10,6% -4,5 % -2,8 % 
Growth % of GDP -0,5%  1,2 % 1,9 % 
Source: Budget Plan, 2012 
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These are the actual figure from 2013 and new predictions for 2014. 
Table 8 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Public Budget 
Deficit 
-10,6% -6,3% -5,9% 
% growth of GDP -1,4% -1,4% 0,8%(prediction) 
Source: OECD economic outlook 92 database; Eurostat national accounts. 
Clearly there is a mismatch between economic prospect predicted in the Budget Plan 
2013-2014 and the actual number and new predictions.  
This also means that the austerity measures and cutbacks in Spain will continue to create 
social catastrophe and decrease domestic demand even further, thereby creating even 
higher unemployment. With the current economic predictions, this devilish spiral will 
persist until external demand grows significantly, or the fiscal policy approach is altered. 
But what is the alternative? In the following chapter we will present a Keynesian 
alternative to the Budget Plan 2013-2014 limited by the competences the ESM hold.  
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A Euro-realist approach to the Budget Plan 
Introduction  
As concluded in the MoU analysis the economic theory behind the Spanish budget plan 
was based on Euro-monetarist theory. Moreover, given the lack of correlation between 
predicted outcomes and actual realities for the recovery of Spain we now present a Euro-
realist alternative to the use of the ESM competences.   
Presenting the Alternative 
As presented in the theory chapter, the Euro-realists focus on Unemployment and the 
balance of payments (BoP). From their perspective the underlying imbalances are 
illustrated in exactly these areas (Jespersen, 2012). Therefore, the purpose of the euro-
realist analysis of economic politics is to correct the market economy when it gets stuck 
in high unemployment and continues balance of payments deficit. We will therefore keep 
our focus here and present alternative solutions possible through the ESM. 
The Euro-realists emphasise what they call the automatic budget stabiliser, which is the 
assumption that there is a negative correlation between the public budget and 
unemployment. The causal explanation is thusly that, if unemployment rises the budget 
deficit grows this correlation is more pronounced in countries with a comprehensive 
social security system. Therefore, if the Spanish budget deficit is to reach 3% SGP limit 
unemployment needs to be the area of focus. 
According to Euro-realists, a free market would bring about too violent economic 
rollercoaster resulting in societal instability and it is therefore the purpose of fiscal policy 
to even out the ride by controlling demand. (Jespersen, 2012) However, Spain is in a 
difficult situation. They have growing unemployment, a growing foreign debt, a growing 
deficit on the BoP, ULC well above the EU average and a productivity-level below. 
From a euro-realist perspective the solution to this would be reached through a number 
of short,- and long-term adjustments. Given the unsustainable state of the macro-
economic numbers such as high unemployment, too high ULC and no or negative GDP 
growth in Spain the Euro-realist would approach the problem by identifying both short 
and long term observations.  
We have seen in the Budget Plan analysis that the MoU hold some power to restructure 
the Spanish public sector and labour market laws, however, the banking sector avoids 
extensive reform, even though they do become the object of intensified attention by the 
FROB. In the following we present our Euro-realist assessment of the macro-economic 
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adjustment programmes in Spain conducted in relation to financial assistance provided 
by ESM.  
We also aim to assess the longer-term needs of the Spanish economy, and whether or 
not the conditionality in the budget plan contribute to correcting the imbalances we have 
found to be the cause of the economic distress. As we conclude in our chapter The 
economic climate in the Eurozone, the underlying problem in the Spanish case has not 
been an irresponsible government, but rather a housing boom enabled by cheap credit 
from financial institutions in the core, pushing wages up and thereby undermining 
Spain’s competitiveness relative to the core countries. 
From a Euro-realist perspective, lowering unemployment is the key to regain growth in 
Spain and this will at the same time improve the public budget deficit in accordance with 
the SGP criteria. “Look after the unemployment and the budget will look after itself”(Keynes, 
1982: p. 150). Jespersen (2012) has calculated an automatic stabiliser in Spain close to 1 
meaning that a 1% decrease in unemployment would be consequently equal a 1% of 
GDP bettering of the budget deficit.  
Figure 14 
 
By focusing on unemployment we, through increased domestic demand, generate growth 
and consolidate the budget balance at the same time. This is in direct opposition to the 
budget plan, where one of the basic assumptions is that the negative demand shock 
caused by the fiscal consolidation will be partially offset by external demand. The 
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question is then how to go about tackling this solution. Looking at Figure 14 there can 
be no doubt that the unemployment rate has an influence on the budget. We showed 
that Jesper Jespersen has calculated the effect unemployment has on the budget to be 
pretty much 1 to 1. His data spans from 1997-2009, with the newly available data we 
have attempted to calculate the causal effect after the Budget Plan has come into effect.  
Figure 15 
 
Including the newer data spanning from 2003 to 2012, as we show in Figure 15, the 
effect is not quite as elegant as 1 to 1. The function indicate that a 1% improvement in 
employment will result in an improvement of 0,8% in the budget. We attribute the slight 
decrease in correlation to the fact that cuts in areas such as social security will naturally 
lead to a smaller strain on the public budget when individuals become available at the 
labour market. Even so, if we decrease unemployment to the 2008 level of 14,9% (an 
improvement of 12,2%), the budget deficit would be decreased to -0,8%, which is 
comfortably within the limit of the SGP, even within the requirement of a structural 
budget deficit better than -1%. This is calculated using the function presented in Figure 
15. 
The Underlying Imbalances 
In a country with a balanced BoP an expansive fiscal strategy would be justified, as the 
competitive position is not problematic in itself. However, as discussed in The economic 
climate in the Eurozone, the Spanish growth in the 00’s was financed by the almost “free 
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money” available, and not exports. Spain had run continuous deficit on the BoP and the 
housing bubble had allowed wages to raise the ULC thereby deteriorating the 
competitive position of Spain. We must therefore focus on lowering the Unit labour 
Cost, the cost of production, in Spain by a combination of internal devaluation and 
productivity increase.  
The diminishing competitive position have meant that much of the wealth produced by 
the period of growth have been transferred out of the country, as reflected in the 
substantial deficit on the current account averaging -5,73% of GDP in the period 2000-
2011 with a peak of -10% of GDP in 2007 (Eurostat – Balance of the Current Account). As 
we show in Figure 12, the Eurozone as a whole has been almost balanced, averaging a 
very small deficit of 0,13% of GDP between 2000 and 2011, meaning, as Figure 12 
shows, core countries on average have cancelled out the periphery-countries deficit. To 
avoid history repeating, namely Spanish GDP growth based on excessive foreign credit, 
the reforms in the budget plan must deal with the large gap in competitiveness in the 
long run. There are of course two parties involved, the core and the periphery, and 
naturally, it could be achieved by diminishing the competitiveness of the core countries 
by conducting expansive fiscal policy in countries like Germany, leading to wage-
inflation, while the Spanish wages would continue to be under pressure due to the 
staggering unemployment rate, further enhanced by an expansive monetary policy by the 
ECB. (Krugman, 2013) This is not within the scope of the competences possessed by the 
ESM, as it cannot impose itself on a country not receiving financial assistance. 
Furthermore, the ECB is mandated to always maintain price stability (ecb.int – Monetary 
Policy). Krugman (2013) also notes that German politicians are not particularly fond of 
inflation due to bad memories of the hyperinflation of the early 1920’s, making it even 
more unlikely that this scenario could come true. 
The ambition and scope of the conditionality is naturally subject to limitations. First of 
all, in the longer run at least, the assisted country will have to meet the requirements in 
the SGP, and seeing as the MoU setting the overall framework for the budget plan is 
devised by the Commission in liaison with the ECB, it is very unlikely that a government 
deficit stretching more than 4-5 years will be excepted.  
As member of the monetary union Spain cannot just devaluate which would have been a 
fast as relatively painless solution to the wage reduction (Krugman, 2013).  Fortunately, 
the SGP also contains the possibility of extraordinary exceptions to these criteria, “As a 
rule, the initial deadline for correcting an excessive deficit should be the year after its identification and 
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thus, normally, the second year after its occurrence unless there are special circumstances”, 
(Commission, 2012, p. 11) 
Such exceptions have already been given to Greece whose corrective deadline for 
consolidating their budget deficit has been moved from 2014 to 2016 (Council, 2012). 
We will argue that such a postponing of the SGP criteria would be favourable for Spain 
as well.  
Before we go in to the alternative overall strategy an important development of last year 
must be introduced for it will have an important impact crucial to our Keynesian 
alternative.  
The importance of Interest Rates 
On the 6th of September 2012 the ECB proclaimed that it would take on the role of 
lender of last resort for the Eurozone. Prior to this announcement a flaw of the 
monetary union had become evident as countries within the Eurozone had proven much 
more vulnerable to changes in market confidence than standalone countries.   
The Spanish Budget Plan is based on the idea that if Spain lowers its public budget 
deficit and reduces the government debt the market will respond by lowering the interest 
rate and investments will return. Since the start of the financial crises both Spain and the 
United Kingdom has steadily increased their public debt however the interest rate on 
their 10-year government bonds have developed very differently. When we look at 
Figure 16 we can see that from 2008 to 2012 their debt more than doubled, however, the 
UK still holds a larger debt to GDP ratio. This would lead us to believe, following a 
monetarist argument, that this increased risk would be displayed in the bonds market.  
Looking to Figure 17 we find that this is clearly not the case. In fact, after the financial 
crisis in 2008 they have developed in a negative correlational fashion with the 10-year 
Spanish bond at 5,7 % and the UK at 2,1% in 2013.  
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Figure 16 
 
Figure 17 
 
This begs the question, why do market react so differently? We rule out that the UK 
banking system was any less hit by the crisis, as “The state of the UK banking sector is certainly 
not much better than the one of Spain” (De Grauwe, 2012, p.256). We will argue that the 
reason for difference in bond rates lie in the difference of monetary policy autonomy.  
The level of interest rate depends on the risk of possible default in the investment, the 
higher the possibility of default the higher the loan rate. To be bone, when a member of 
a monetary union issues debt it does so in a currency that it doesn’t control. When a 
“standalone” country issues debt it is in a currency that it controls. This has an important 
impact. Members of the EMU cannot guarantee bondholders that there will be funds to 
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pay up when their bonds mature. Standalone countries give an implicit guarantee because 
their central banks still hold the power to print more cash and will do so if pushed by its 
government. Consequently, in times of crisis the market perceives that Spain has a higher 
possibility of default than the UK as displayed by the bond rates in Figure 17.  This also 
means that members of the EMU are very vulnerable to liquidity movements, as has 
been displayed in the current situation of the periphery members. A high level of debt is 
only dangerous if investors fear for their investment. This fear of insolvency has a habit 
of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
In a situation where markets distrust a government they will sell their bonds. The interest 
rate will increase to reflect the markets belief that there is a higher risk of default. The 
higher interest rate does actually increase the risk of default, putting further strain on the 
public budget, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. The markets have, unintentionally, 
made sure that their mistrust in the government becomes reality. (De Grauwe, 2012) 
Looking at countries like the USA (133% of GDP in 2013) and Japan (224% of GDP in 
2013) with gross government debt much higher than Spain (100% of GDP in 2013) we 
can see the difference of how the market calculates the risk of monetary members and 
standalone countries. (OECD – Government Debt; Krugman, 2013). As we can see, the 
interest rates no longer reflect the debt-levels in the different countries, as countries with 
significantly larger debt-levels than Spain do not see correspondingly higher interest rates 
(London School of Economics – European Politics and Policy) 
Now that the ECB has guaranteed sovereign bonds of Eurozone members, we should 
see the elevated bond rates in Spain dissent to a level closer to that of the UK creating 
some air in the budget and neutralising the importance of its debt. The relatively large 
gross government debt is no longer a problem as seen in the United Kingdom and the 
interest rate of Spanish bonds have already dropped according to the latest Eurostat 
statistics. This allows Spain to shift its focus from debt-reduction to fighting 
unemployment. 
Dissecting the alternative 
Spain needs to stop its growing unemployment (26,7% in march 2013) if it is to turn the 
economy around. (OECD – Economic Outlook no. 92) We do have to accept that certain 
limitations exist when considering the MoU and subsequently Spanish budget plan. Due 
to the restrictions, in order to reduce the gap in competitiveness, Spain must in the long 
run conduct some sort of internal devaluation, or put in other words, decrease the ULC 
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relative to the core countries. (De Grauwe, 2012; Krugman, 2013) As we show in the 
chapter on the conditionality imposed on Spain, the importance of the competitive 
position in the long term is not lost on the Commission, ECB and ESM. In the 
Macroeconomic scenario it is forecasted that, the “(…) internal devaluation process and 
reforms will indirectly favour exports, through increased external competitiveness and increased GDP 
potential in all its components: Total Factor Productivity, capital and labour.” (Spanish Budget Plan 
2012: p. 9) As shown in table 17 in the Budget plan one of the ways in which this internal 
devaluation will be achieved is by substantially lowering public employee compensation 
from accounting for 11,5% of GDP to 9,6% of GDP in the period 2011-2014. This 
represents a decrease of approximately 16,5%, which is quite substantial. In the 
walkthrough of the public sector measures taken we go into more detail on the specific 
measures taken, but the most important measures are a hiring freeze in the public sector 
evened out by a longer working week negating the need for extra hiring and limiting 
overtime pay (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). We assess that the line of thought justifying 
this action is based on the assumption that by limiting the supply of jobs, with the same 
demand, the market forces will readjust the wage level to obtain full employment once 
more in a rather short period of time.  
Furthering the pressure for readjustment of wages is the measures taken in the general 
employment and social security part of the Budget Plan. As we detail in the chapter on 
the Budget Plan, a 50% cut in employment benefits after the 7th month out of work and 
increasing the retirement age will further increase the supply of labour. Once again, this 
is supposed to lower the wage level thereby fulfilling the aim of GDP growth caused by 
increased external demand in the long run, partially offsetting the decrease in domestic 
demand. (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012) 
However, we will argue that it is not only about salary it is also about reality. The wage 
levels are more rigid than the model predicts in fact a lowering of a countries ULC by 
only focusing on wage reductions is long and painful “(…) wages are downwardly rigid: they 
fall only slowly and grudgingly, even in the face of massive unemployment” (Krugman, 2013, p. 181).  
Further emphasising the need for alternatives to the internal devaluation through 
pressure on the wage-level is the fact that wages do not seem to be very flexible. Ireland, 
having experienced several years of unemployment in the region of 14% has only seen 
the wage-level drop by approximately 4% (Krugman, 2013). If we look at the numbers 
for Spain in the past years with high, and indeed rising unemployment, there does not 
seem to be much correspondence between the unemployment level and wages. 
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Table 9 
Spain 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Unemployment 11,4% 18,1% 20,2% 21,8% 25,2% 
Wage level  €19,4 €20,5 €20,7 €21,2 €21,0 
Source :  Eurostat  -  Employment & Unemployment ;  Eurostat ,  2013: p.  3 
Looking at the figures for the past four years in Table 9, the increase in supply of labor 
due to unemployment has not resulted in lower wages, in fact, whereas the 
unemployment rate has surged, the hourly wage compensation have continued its growth 
by 8,3% (Eurostat, 2013). The data is on services and industry excluding the public 
sector. Now, the 8,3% is in itself not that alarming, seeing as the Eurozone as a whole 
has increased on average 8,7% (Eurostat, 2013), meaning the Spanish competitive 
position has improved ever so slightly. Table 9 highlights the problem with lowering 
wages, the costs are very high, as 4 years with soaring unemployment is an example of, 
and the gains are very little. It would appear that pressing the wages is indeed very hard, 
as evidenced by the increasing wage level despite very high unemployment. This 
development directly contradicts the forecast in the Budget Plan, which relies on wage 
reduction as the key to external competitiveness and again asking for alternative 
solutions. Moreover, the combination of the inflation fighting ECB and the enormous 
private debt in Spain primarily situated in the overheated real estate prices prior to the 
crisis puts a long-term hold on domestic demand and investment. Additionally, narrow 
focus on internal devaluation solely via wage-pressure darken the prospect of domestic 
demand even more as the euro is not devaluated the wage drop is a de facto inflation of 
the private debt itself making economic prospects even grimmer.  
When faced with a situation like this, namely a poor competitive position, the answer is 
usually devaluation, as happened in Iceland where Bank assets grew from 170% of GDP 
to 880% of GDP from 2003-2008 (Armingeon & Baccaro, 2012). They responded by 
devaluing the Króna enough to better their competitive position by 25% (Krugman, 
2013). Devaluing has the added bonus that it will theoretically lead to inflation, alleviating 
some of the debt problem (Armingeon & Baccaro, 2012).6  
As we have described earlier, this is not an option as Spain is in the Eurozone. As we 
have now shown the options are rather limited. It is difficult to slash wages or even 
                                                
6 It has to be noted that Iceland actually defaulted on their externally held assets in the financial sector, 
lowering the cost of the financial assistance. 
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keeping them level, as evidenced in Table 9 even though a country is going through 
unemployment in excess of 18% for several years. 
As shown in our chapter, The economic climate in the Eurozone the current public debt 
was not the fault of an inefficient public sector but extensive private debt. We therefore 
refrain for copying the massive austerity plan for the public sector as it was not the 
source of the problem and that such cutbacks only create more unemployment and less 
domestic demand. Instead we propose a plan of public investment which is funded by 
further public debt. With the ECB taking on the role of lender of last resort the public 
debt level of Spain is no longer the most pressing problem for bond rates as exemplified 
with the UK. By introducing public investments instead of austerity we can stimulate 
domestic demand in the short run while improving the ULC and the BoP in the longer 
term to avoid transferring the growth out of the country once more. We therefore dissect 
the current account to locate the root of the ULC increase.  
Figure 18 
 
When we look at the current account history of Spain since the beginning of the 
monetary union we see that between 2000-2004 the deficit is relatively steady at 4%. 
Between 2004-2008 we observe more than a doubling in the deficit on the current 
account supporting the notion that the Spanish growth was fuelled by loans and not 
exports. The ULC is the key and as presented in Figure 11 the difference between Spain 
and Germany is 10 index points. Remembering that the ULC is the cost of production 
adjusted for productivity, factors like wages, productivity, taxes and infrastructure are all 
contributing to the ULC. If we are to improve the ULC in Spain we must identify where 
improvements are lacking. The two most easily attained factors are the wage-
Spain 
Germany 
-12 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
Current Account as % of GDP  
Source: Eurostat - Balance of the Current Account 
 73 
development and the development in productivity, but as we have shown, wages are not 
actually that easily pressured downwards.  
Figure 19 
 
 
Looking at Figure 19, before the crisis we see that the Spanish wage increase is 20% 
higher than the German and that the productivity growth is 10% lower in 2008. 
Consequently, to lower the ULC focus by reducing the wage level would seem like the 
reasonable curse of action, seeing as Figure 19 shows a consistent hourly wage increase 
the last 12 years. However, by looking at the hourly wage in Table 10 of both countries 
in Euro’s we find that even after the consistent growth the Spanish wage level is still 
considerably lower than the German. The increase in the Spanish wages have not been 
followed by a corresponding increases in productivity, as illustrated in Figure 19, the 
German productivity increase had actually surpassed wage increases when the crisis hit in 
2008.  
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Table 10 
Labour costs per hour in euro, whole economy  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Germany 27,9 28,6 28,8 29,6 
Spain 19,4 20,5 20,7 21,2 
Source: Eurostat, 2013. Excludes Agriculture & Public Administration  
 
It seems that the area of focus should be increasing productivity instead of relying solely 
on an internal devaluation. Wages measured in Euro’s are still considerably higher in 
Germany than in Spain but the German productivity increased far more than the Spanish 
thereby creating the considerable gap in the ULC. Furthermore, Armingeon and Baccaro 
(2012) suggest the low productivity growth is a consequence of the building boom 
resulting in an employment expansion in a low-productivity sector. 
Short and Long Term Solutions 
To obtain a lower Spanish ULC, the macro-economic adjustment programme will have 
to restrain the wage levels and increase productivity growth. This is no easy feat to 
achieve. To gain growth in productivity, investments must be focussed on productivity 
enhancing areas such as transportation, education, infrastructure, telecommunications, 
healthcare has a positive effect on domestic demand in the short term and the ULC in a 
long-term perspective (Jespersen, 2012; Blakemore & Herrendorf, 2009; Röller & 
Waverman, 2001).  Productivity growth is thusly enhanced, by, among other things, 
technological development and improved educational level in the population. 
Additionally in times of growing unemployment such investments dampen deteriorating 
demand developments and secondly boost the productivity in the future for the 
economy as a whole. “There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that public infrastructure contributes 
significantly to growth of output, reduction on costs and increase in profitability” (Chakraborty & 
Dabla-Norris, 2009, p.15) In this new light it seems very counterproductive to slash 
budgets on education as is executed in the Spanish Budget Plan. Spain will not attain a 
balanced BoP by betting on low-productivity labor in the long run. 
At first this will worsen the public budget balance even further but as the Eurozone 
regains its growth, and with an improved competitive position the automatic stabiliser 
will balance the account and make the risk of default even smaller thus making the public 
debt even more obsolete (De Grauwe, 2012). The aim would be to enhance domestic 
demand in the short term, and increase productivity in the longer term, to better the 
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competitive position, hopefully fuelling external demand by lowering the ULC. Trying to 
increase domestic demand, the plan of increasing taxation by increasing the VAT, as 
described in our walkthrough of the Spanish Budget Plan, seems mistimed at best. A 
projected €9bn of €15bn is supposed to come from the increase in VAT on goods in 
Spanish stores (Spanish Budget Plan, 2012). Increasing the cost of Spanish goods will 
neither spur domestic nor external demand as it makes domestic goods relatively more 
expensive. Therefore this proposal seems counterproductive, unless the revenue will be 
re-invested in areas where it can increase productivity. The Spanish Budget Plan makes 
no mention of this, but in keeping with the fact that all the financial assistance from 
ESM is going to be injected into the financial sector, the increases in VAT could be 
reinvested in society. The effectiveness of the investment, of course due to the increased 
price of goods, will not be as large as without the VAT-increase, as it limits the macro-
economic multiplier.  
When investing, the macro-economic multiplier will elevate the domestic demand level. 
The public investment multiplier effect is the macro-economic idea that an initial 
disbursement into the economy increases demand that creates a boost in production 
increasing private investment like rings in the water.  The more willingness there is to 
spend in an economy the more effective the multiplier. We can see the negative 
correlational nature of decreasing demand and increasing unemployment for Spain 
below. Remembering that the domestic demand change is measured from the level 
recorded the previous year we see that Spain gets a demand shock in 2009 and between 
2008-2013 the domestic demand has kept falling to an accumulated -17,2% (OECD, 
2012). The correlation of -0,713, as illustrated in Figure 20, reveals that domestic demand 
and the labour market are interdependent reaffirming our focus on demand to increase 
employment.  
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Figure 20 
 
The increased demand will create employment and the automatic stabiliser effect seen in 
Figure 15 will improve the budget deficit in the calculated 0,8% per 1% increase in 
employment. This rests on the assumption that the increased demand will stay inside 
Spain, meaning the choice of sectors to invest in is key, as sectors resting their 
production on importing materials etc. will transfer some of the money out of the 
Spanish system.  
Table 11 
Spain 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Correlation to 
Unemployment 
Unemployment 11,4% 18,1% 20,2% 21,8% 25,2%  
Social Security 
Funds (% of GDP) 
12,3% 14,3% 15,0% 14,9% 15,3% 0,959 
Total Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
41,5% 46,3% 46,3% 45,2% 47,0% 0,874 
Total Deficit  
(% of GDP) 
-4,5% -11,2% -9,7% -9,4% -10,6% -0,804 
Source :  Eurostat  -  Employment & Unemployment ;  Eurostat  -  Annual Government 
Finance Stat is t i c s  
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Shown in Table 11 is the unemployment rate compared to government spending, both in 
social security and total, compared to the unemployment rate, we have then calculated 
the correlation between the expenditure and unemployment, and not surprisingly the 
expenditure in social security is almost perfectly correlated to unemployment. In essence, 
if Spain is to live up to a deficit limit of 3%, as demanded in the SGP, unemployment 
appears to be key. Taking this into account and the fact that pressuring wages through 
increased supply of labour appear to have long prospects and the inability to devalue the 
currency the best remaining tools to increase employment would be to increase domestic 
demand while restraining wages, and increasing productivity, making it a partial internal 
devaluation. Furthermore, when such investments are made in productivity enhancing 
sectors such as infrastructure positive effects on ULC can be expected in the longer term 
as well (Jespersen, 2012; Jespersen, 2009).  
Sub-Conclusion 
In this chapter we have summarised the underlying imbalances in the Eurozone needing 
fixing in order to restore sustainable growth in Spain. In comparing what the 
dysfunctional underlying structures are with the action taken in the Budget Plan we 
attempt to provide an alternative corresponding to the imbalances distorting the 
Eurozone.  
Based on our assessment of the economic situation and the fact that the aim must be to 
once again meet the SGP requirements; a relatively low debt and deficit level, we believe 
that there is a need for some degree of internal devaluation to regain lost 
competitiveness. The Budget Plan devised in relation to ESM operation based on the 
MoU rests on what we believe, and empirically indicate, is a flawed basis. The response 
does seem to somewhat work towards correcting the imbalances persisting throughout 
the 00’s by focusing on an internal devaluation through pressuring the wage-level. 
Unfortunately we do not believe the strategy take the economic climate sufficiently into 
account, and the staunch focus on wage-pressure is poorly timed at best, and inefficient 
at worst. We show that wages are not very downward flexible in Table 9, as high and 
rising unemployment have not been able to keep the wage level, let alone lower them. In 
stead the rising unemployment, through the automatic stabiliser, will result in an even 
higher public deficit, as evidenced in Table 11, naturally leading to a rising public debt. 
To be able to once again meet the requirements in SGP, we propose that more focus is 
given to the alarming unemployment-level touching ¼ of the population.  
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We accept that restrain in wages are indeed needed to improve ULC and thereby the 
competitive position, however, as wages are very rigid, we present an alternative strategy 
based on investment in areas likely to increase productivity in the long term. By creating 
artificial demand in key-sectors prone to domestic production the unemployment will 
decrease alleviating pressure on the public budget and improving domestic demand 
further, igniting a positive multiplier of increased domestic demand. We further base the 
need for domestic demand on the fact that the Spanish economy is not very competitive, 
meaning we do not expect external demand, as the MoU and Budget Plan do, will 
increase much. There is a risk that the increased demand facilitated by the public 
investment could lead to increased wages, which is why we acknowledge that there is a 
need for sustaining low wage-growth for a prolonged period to prevent wage-inflation 
from consuming the increase in productivity leaving Spain in the same poor position. 
The structural reforms in the Budget Plan may therefore be relevant in the longer-term, 
or in a watered down version in the short-term, but the negative demand shock caused 
by the current budget plan is only likely to increase unemployment and thereby the strain 
on the Spanish budget, and indeed the Spanish People as a whole who are propelled in to 
poverty.   
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Table 12 
Imbalance Budget Plan Solution Our Solution 
Macro-economic 
imbalances 
! Unemployment  
! Unit labour cost 
! Balance of 
Payments 
Facilitate an Internal 
Devaluation through a 
labour market reform: 
! Increase working 
hours 
! Increase 
retirement-age 
! Increase flexibility 
to decrease wage-
rigidity 
! Lower 
unemployment 
benefits 
 
Facilitate a partial internal 
devaluation by:  
! Restraining wages in the 
longer term 
Focus on enhancing 
productivity: 
! Education 
! Infrastructure 
! Transportation 
! Telecommunications 
This will reduce the need for 
wage-reduction, as productivity 
decreases the ULC.  
 
National accounts 
! Public Budget 
deficit  
! Public debt 
Decrease public spending 
through:  
! Hiring Freeze 
! Decrease spending 
on public services 
! Increase Taxation 
(Direct & Indirect) 
! Cut Social Benefits 
Create domestic demand by:  
! Public investment in 
productivity-enhancing 
sectors 
! Decrease 
unemployment 
National Accounts are not too 
important, as the lowered 
unemployment will solve the 
budget.  
 
We acknowledge that these alternative solutions would require a turnaround in the 
economic paradigm of the commission but first of all a political u-turn away from the 
position that; “(…) nations are in trouble because they have sinned and they must redeem themselves 
through suffering” (Krugman 2013, p.179) and acknowledge that the crisis was global and 
the macro-economic imbalances inherent in the EMU are the biggest reasons why the 
Eurozone stand divided today. If these alternative plans are to have a chance of 
realisation solidarity must be at the centre of negotiations.     
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Conclusion 
We sat out to answer the following problem formulation. 
How does the ESM attempt to decrease the macro-economic imbalances within the Eurozone and is there 
a viable alternative? 
 
We conclude that the ESM attempts to decrease the macro-economic imbalances within 
the Eurozone through the conditionality attached to the financial assistance it distributes. 
As a result of our analysis of the Spanish Budget Plan we conclude that the ESM 
successfully identified the primary macro-economic imbalance for Spain as being their 
poor external competitiveness displayed in their persistent BoP deficit. The ESM’s 
solution is based on a reduction of the wage level thereby decreasing the Spanish ULC 
and boosting external demand. This single focus on supply side economics reveals a 
Euro-monetarist conviction. 
 
The Euro-monetarist reasoning is persistent also in the ESM’s attempt to consolidate the 
Spanish budget. The causality presented in the Budget Plan is that by reducing public 
budget deficits and debt market confidence will increase thereby lowering the interest 
rate on Spanish bonds and increase investment. We therefore conclude that the 
economic reasoning of the current ESM follows that the Euro-monetarists.  
 
The EMU has contributed to macroeconomic imbalances between its member states in 
the form of high surpluses on the BoP in the core and correspondingly large deficits in 
the peripheral countries. The fact that financial markets have perceived Eurozone-
countries as equal in risk, and thereby equally low interest rates, has allowed countries 
like Spain to ignore its rising deficit on the Balance of Payments and finance excessive 
domestic demand through private borrowing in financial institutions of the core, fuelling 
a housing bubble. While the bubble was inflating, the Spanish Government has had its 
budget under control, even performing better than core countries on the criteria set up in 
the SGP. We conclude that the determining factor in the crisis today is the steady 
deterioration of external competitiveness that the periphery recorded during the 00’s, as 
illustrated.  
These inherent weaknesses have made the impact of the financial crisis much harder on 
peripheral members due to the deteriorated competitive position. Countries with a high 
ULC cannot export their way out of the crisis. Recognising that Greece was not 
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Germany, one by one, periphery members have been downgraded by the rating agencies 
resulting in soaring interest rates. And one by one, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and finally 
Spain have threatened the financial stability of the Eurozone. This has been the basis for 
creating the ESM.  
We conclude that the ESM holds the potential to play an important role, as it possesses 
the ability to shape fiscal policy in a country in need of financial assistance. The ESM is 
the sole institutions available to distressed economies within the EU, and any financial 
assistance restriction must be followed by strict conditionality. The term, strict conditionality, is 
not more clearly elaborated upon, meaning the Commission in liaison with ECB and if 
possible IMF assess the macro-economic adjustment needed on a case-by-case basis. The 
approach taken in the MoU is not predetermined to any serious extent, and, pending the 
economic conviction held by the three actors and unanimous approval from the Board 
of Governors, can be devised to suit the need of the country. Naturally, the approach 
taken is also limited by the requirements dictated outside of the ESM, such as the SGP. 
As the ESM is the only available option to an economically challenged country, it is in a 
powerful position to impose itself on the country. 
 
In our theoretical chapter we formulate two distinct schools of thought to both 
illuminate and solve the underlying imbalances in the EMU, the Euro-monetarist and the 
Euro-realist. When combining the competences of the treaty with the external 
restrictions like the SGP and anti-inflationary nature of ECB, we conclude that the causal 
explanation presented by the Euro-monetarists appear deeply ingrained in the framework 
surrounding the ESM. This is also true when looking at the measures presented in the 
Spanish Budget Plan. The main objective is to consolidate the public budget by severely 
restraining expenditure and increasing income. To this end Spain is forced to conduct an 
internal devaluation through a labour market reform, affecting working hours, 
retirements-age, wages, unemployment benefits, a hiring freeze in the public sector and 
increased taxation, direct and indirect.  
 
Empirically studying the imbalances causing the crisis, namely the poor competitive 
position of Spain as reflected in the comparatively high ULC, we conclude that the Euro-
monetarist approach will do little to solve the imbalances let alone consolidate the 
budget. We conclude that the unemployment will lead to little more than stagnating 
wage-inflation while rising unemployment will continue to strain the public budget. We 
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base this on our empirical findings, as the predictions for growth in 2013, as presented in 
the Budget Plan has not held true, nor did the predictions of the Spanish budget and 
debt. Following our analysis we thereby conclude that the Budget Plan has failed to 
deliver on its promise of growth through austerity leading us to propose a viable 
alternative within the limitations of the treaty and surrounding framework. 
 
As an alternative we present an overall strategy comprised of short-term public 
investments to instigate domestic demand and increase employment. We furthermore 
show that wages are downward rigid, causing us to turn our attention to the productivity-
level in stead. Therefore the proposed public investment must be in sectors prone to re-
investing domestically and improve productivity. In the longer term we accept that wage-
inflation must be restrained to avoid the productivity-increases to be cancelled out by 
increasing wages. Essentially, many of the measures in the Spanish Budget Plan may very 
well be necessary, but we find them mistimed, as they will destroy domestic demand at a 
time where the poor competitive position makes it very essential.  
 
We therefore conclude that the ESM’s attempts to decrease the macro-economic 
imbalances of the Eurozone will not be achieved by following the Euro-monetarist 
approach utilised in Spain. 
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Discussion 
In this paper decisions that have limited the scope of our analysis are of course 
necessary. We will now outline some of the implications of these necessary choices as 
well as interesting angles and potential further research. 
 
The premise for the realisation our budget plan alternative is based on a change in the 
political climate within the Eurozone, which is also acknowledged by the different 
economist, as Krugman (2013) and Jespersen (2012,). Our problem area has been 
focussed on the macro-economic imbalances of the Eurozone and how the ESM can 
contribute in solving them. With the economic focus, other influences on ESM like the 
political aspect have been neglected. The reason for this limitation is that we sought to 
propose an alternative solution to the current direction taken in the EU. This was done 
well knowing that the political sphere has a decisive impact on the development of the 
ESM and therefore the economical effects. This is evident with the measures taken 
through different programs, as for instance the MoU, the FFA, the FROB and the 
Spanish budget plan, which are all formed by the political will of the EU. To further 
underscore this argument the loans given from the ESM are given with strict 
conditionality’s on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, The ESM Treaty is formulated in a 
fashion that allows for changes in financial instruments and conditionality depending on 
the economic and political situation at any given time. This makes the ESM very prone 
to political influence and diversified in its political use. To have this aspect in the analysis 
would have been either very extensive, or very superficial, and this is why the political 
aspect is not further examined in this paper. It is in this lighting that an obvious 
extension to this analysis, would be one of the political climate in the Eurozone. The 
realisation of our fiscal policy alternative depends on a change in the political climate of 
the Eurozone. The current “blame game” is not only very unproductive for finding a 
viable long term solution it also forgets that this problem was created together. In 
continuation to our conclusions it would be very interesting to conduct an analysis of 
how to bring about change in the political persuasion of the core members.  
 
 This paper can be seen as a starting point for future analysis’ of the ESM. The 
recapitalisation of the Spanish financial sector was the first activation of the institution 
and our findings can be compared and built upon in the future. With this analyse strong 
indicator on the economic persuasion currently held in the ESM are apparent, but they 
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might change when facing other member states, as the demands are formed on an ad hoc 
basis. Therefore the contribution of this paper, is a snapshot of the ESM actions taken 
regarding the macro-economic imbalances experienced in Spain, but further cases are 
needed in order to make a more general statement on ESM practice. 
 
The crisis has also displayed the financial sector within the member states of the EU as 
being a dangerous sector for society as whole. The Spanish Budget Plan and all its 
austerity measures are the conditions for bank recapitalisation. This has led the European 
Commission to suggest on 12 september 2012 a European Banking Union. A Banking 
Union would as Douglas J. Elliot suggest in key issues on European Banking Union (2012), be 
able to deal with existing banks weaknesses, and reduce the risk of a new Euro crisis, and 
thereby restoring the effectiveness of the monetary policy. This proposal also have deep 
political spore, and would rely on a broad consensus between the government leaders of 
member states of the Euro. As a continuation of our conclusions, in relation to prevent 
future bailouts and social unrest, the implications and possible preventive merits of a 
Banking Union would be relevant. 
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